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ARTICLES

The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility
Ronen Avraham† & William H.J. Hubbard††
Sometimes the rules let you change the rules. In civil procedure, many rules
are famously rigid—for example, neither the parties nor the judge can stipulate to
subject matter jurisdiction—but closer inspection yields many ways that judges or
parties (individually or by agreement) can change procedural defaults, such as the
number of depositions, trial by judge or jury, or sometimes even jurisdiction.
Whether the judge or parties have “flexibility” to change the rules of the game is an
important, but understudied, aspect of procedure.
This Article is the first to document the full spectrum of procedural flexibility—
the varied and sometimes surprising range of ways in which judges and parties can
modify procedure in their cases. We show that procedural flexibility spans a broad
spectrum from rigid inflexibility, to contracts that modify procedure, to unilateral
control over procedure, and beyond, to a new frontier of innovations—buying and
selling of procedures between parties in different cases, and markets or auctions for
everything from depositions to jury trials. Some of these possibilities seem radical,
but we show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, current civil practice already
permits similarly radical flexing of procedure.
As a normative matter, we argue that even radical forms of flexibility (like
markets in procedure) cannot be ruled out based on familiar normative criteria such
as efficient dispute resolution, norm creation, distributive justice, or facilitation of
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democratic participation in the legal system. To the contrary, such forms of procedural flexibility may offer unexpected avenues for addressing inequities of the current status quo.
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INTRODUCTION
For students, and even for teachers, it is easy to see civil procedure as a fixed (albeit perplexing) set of rules. Parties in civil
litigation have at their disposal all sorts of rigid, even numerically
quantified, procedural entitlements. In federal court, for example,
parties are entitled to discovery, including ten depositions, 1

1

FRCP 30(a)(2)(A).
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twenty-five interrogatories,2 and an indefinite number of requests
for the production of documents.3 In cases “at common law,” parties have a right to trial by jury.4 Under the “final judgment rule,”
parties have a right to one appeal only at the end of a case.5 And
on and on.
As a general matter, however, the notion that the law imposes a fixed set of procedures on civil litigants is false. Many
rules are mere defaults and can be adjusted if parties do not want
some of their entitlements or feel that their entitlements are not
enough. Sometimes a party can get around a rule by convincing
its adversary or the judge to deviate from a default, but sometimes not. For example, parties can agree to increase or decrease
the number of depositions, interrogatories, or document requests, 6 but they cannot agree to overlook the “final judgment
rule.”7 Parties can agree not to have a jury when they are entitled
to one, but they cannot grant themselves a jury trial merely by
agreement. 8 In other words, sometimes procedure is “flexible,”
and sometimes it isn’t.
This poses a bundle of related questions: Who can modify procedural defaults? (The judge? The parties by mutual agreement?
One party unilaterally?) Which procedures can be modified? Does
the current state of the law, which intermingles rigid rules with
bendable ones, make sense normatively? Together, these questions fall under the rubric of “procedural flexibility”: the ability of
judges and parties, either jointly or independently, to modify default procedures. In this Article, we examine what we call the
“spectrum of procedural flexibility”—the broad and sometimes
surprising range of ways in which judges and parties can control
or modify the rules in their cases.

2

FRCP 33(a)(1).
See FRCP 34.
4
US Const Amend VII.
5
See 28 USC §§ 1291–92.
6
See FRCP 30, 33, 34.
7
A colorful illustration of this in a recent, high-profile case is In re Warrant to
Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 15
F Supp 3d 466 (SDNY 2014), revd and vacd, 829 F3d 197 (2d Cir 2016), vacd as moot, 138
S Ct 1186 (2018). Precisely because parties cannot stipulate around the final judgment
rule, the district court refused to accept an agreement between the parties that an earlier
order of the court was a final judgment. In response, Microsoft filed a motion asking the
court to hold it in contempt so that there would be an appealable final judgment (the contempt order). The court obliged, and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court. See
United States v Microsoft Corp, 138 S Ct 1186, 1187 (2018).
8
See FRCP 38, 39.
3
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One important aspect of procedural flexibility—parties’ ability to modify procedure by agreement—has attracted the attention of an active literature. This literature, which we discuss in
greater detail in Part I.A, frames procedural flexibility as a choice
between either private contracts between the parties to modify
procedures in their case or no procedural flexibility for the parties. Scholars have grappled with one key question: When is an
agreement between the parties to modify the procedure in their
case a permissible use of contracting, and when do we forbid private exchange?
Two major concepts emerge from this literature. First, there
is a “core” of procedure that cannot be altered by the parties.
These are the aspects of procedure that are central to the functioning or legitimacy of the courts, such as rules governing the
recusal of judges, judicial control over oral arguments and decisionmaking, and the right to appeal. Second, outside of this “core,”
contracts between parties should be invalidated only in limited
circumstances, such as when the contract harms third parties or
contains unacceptably one-sided terms.
This core/non-core framework captures common intuitions
about how procedural flexibility works in practice, but as we will
document in Part I.B, this framework incompletely characterizes
the current landscape of procedural flexibility. By focusing on the
most familiar form of flexibility—contracts between the parties—
this framework overlooks other forms of procedural flexibility and
cannot predict innovation in these forms. In other words, current
scholarship (1) neglects forms of procedural flexibility that
deserve study and are already prevalent in doctrine and legal
practice and (2) leaves new forms of procedural flexibility
undiscovered.
The existing literature on procedural flexibility also struggles
to rationalize the normative basis for the core/non-core distinction. For example, if the “core” exists to protect the legitimacy of
judicial decision-making, why do parties have control over how
much evidence the judge sees (which could profoundly affect the
quality of a watershed decision) but not over whether the judge’s
decision is written or oral (which in most cases will have zero effect on the quality or legitimacy of the court’s decision)? For another example, if we conclude that private contracts between parties are undesirable, why is the only remedy to take away private
contracting? Are we so sure that the problem with “private contracts between parties” is that it involves “private contracts,” or
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could the problem be that the contracts are limited to being “between parties”? If so, couldn’t the remedy be to expand private
exchanges to include contracts between parties and nonparties?
Lastly, is it reasonable to expect that the answers to the previous
questions will be the same all the time for all types of cases? Is it
reasonable to expect that civil procedure should be a one-size-fitsall set of rules?
With these questions in mind, we set out in this paper as cartographers to survey the landscape of procedural flexibility and
catalog the full spectrum of procedural flexibility in practice. We
also embark as explorers to discover entirely new approaches to
procedural design that can expand the reformer’s toolkit. Our approach here is primarily descriptive and taxonomic. We reframe
questions of procedural design not as “Which procedures are in
the core and therefore cannot be modified?” but as “Where on the
spectrum of procedural flexibility does this procedure belong?” or
“Which cases can utilize which forms of procedural flexibility?”
What we find is that most of what lawyers and academics
think they know about procedural flexibility is wrong. There are
more types of flexibility than we realize. Some types that seem
novel are in fact commonplace, and some truly radical types may
be normatively superior to the status quo we take for granted.
In Part II, we begin this process of charting the landscape by
examining the understudied dimensions of procedural flexibility
that already exist in practice. These aspects of procedural flexibility, even though ubiquitous in practice, have largely avoided
sustained examination.9 Our contribution in Part II is to provide
a detailed examination of the many forms of flexibility embedded
in current procedure.
We uncover an entire spectrum of procedural forms that allow modifications by one or both parties, with or without the
court’s involvement. Some points on the spectrum are well studied, such as flexibility by agreement between the parties, 10 or
“no-flex” rules where neither the parties nor the judge have any

9
Procedural flexibility keeps a low profile in case reports and jurisprudence. After
all, flexibility involves discretion and agreement as the basis for procedure, two factors
that steer cases away from the spotlight of appellate review. Appellate courts defer to
discretionary decisions in lower courts; agreement means that issues aren’t disputed, and
therefore aren’t the subject of appellate opinions.
10 Many discovery rules have this character. The numeric limits on depositions and
interrogatories can be lifted by party agreement. See FRCP 30 (depositions) and 33 (interrogatories). See also Part II.A.4.
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discretion.11 Other points on the spectrum are more obscure. For
example, sometimes there must be agreement among the judge
and all the parties to budge a default, while other times the law
allows the judge, or even a single party, to freely deviate from the
rule as she sees fit.12
We then discuss how the degree of procedural flexibility can
vary by venue and by case, such that the same procedures may
have different degrees of flexibility in different contexts. For some
smaller-value claims, a plaintiff may have a choice between filing
in a small-claims division of a state court or in a federal district
court. Not only will procedures differ, but procedural flexibility
will differ dramatically, too. Moving from one forum to the other,
procedural options that are unthinkable in one setting become
routine in the other.13
In Part III, we shift our focus from cataloging the present to
discerning the future. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules” or “Rules”) expressly permit and even encourage procedural flexibility. But lawyers, judges, and rulemakers tend to
take for granted that bargaining by the parties to modify the procedures in their case must take place within that case.
For example, the Federal Rules allow each party to take ten
depositions without having to request court approval, but parties
can agree to more.14 A plaintiff can agree to take three extra depositions by negotiating with the defendant in that case, perhaps
by offering the defendant three extra depositions as well. Yet, a
plaintiff can’t get three extra depositions by paying a defendant
in a different case to take three fewer depositions. Why not? Our
imagination should not be limited by the status quo.
In this Article, we expand the range of procedural flexibility
to its full limits. We imagine procedural flexibility not merely as
agreements between parties but as a spectrum from rigid inflexibility to unilateral control and beyond—to wholesale selling and

11 Federal subject matter jurisdiction is often described in this way, although as we
shall discuss, it is more complicated than this! See Part II.A.1.
12 Either party’s unilateral right to invoke trial by jury in suits at common law is the
most familiar example of unilateral flexibility. See FRCP 38(b). We canvass less wellknown examples of unilateral flexibility in Part II.A.2 (judge) and Part II.A.5 (one party).
More broadly, Professor Alexandra Lahav’s recent work has begun to illuminate the broad
but underappreciated degree to which judges exercise discretion to deviate from default
procedure. Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 Vand L Rev 821, 861–62 (2018).
13 See Part II.B.
14 FRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(i).
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trading of procedures across cases, with markets or auctions for
procedural entitlements from depositions to jury trials.15
These ideas may sound radical, even outlandish. The idea of
trading procedural entitlements across cases seems utterly alien
to current practice. And our instincts tell us that markets in procedure would offend norms of professional legal ethics, not to
mention make for lousy policy.
Yet these ideas are less radical than you might think. Our
claim is not merely that one can imagine previously undiscovered
forms of flexibility; rather, it is that once we imagine them and
know what to look for, we find versions of these radical forms of
procedural flexibility already in use. We don’t just imagine the
future, we also uncover hidden features of the present. Consider
these possibilities:


Trading procedures across cases. Why not create a market
where lawyers in one case give up their day in court so
that another case gets extra attention, so long as both clients benefit from the bargain?



Raising pleading standards in exchange for easier recovery.
Why not let a judge raise the bar for pleading in exchange
for an easier path to victory if the complaint survives a
motion to dismiss?



Auctions. Why not have the court system auction off the
juiciest procedural entitlements to the highest bidder?

Such radical notions as these will never see the light of day in a
courtroom, right? Well . . .
Of course, lawyers don’t label what they are doing as “trading
procedures across cases.” But in literally thousands of civil cases
in federal court every year, groups of lawyers do, in fact, make
deals to ask for less procedure in some cases in exchange for more
judicial attention in others. (And judges go along with this.)16
And of course, judges don’t label what they are doing as “raising pleading standards in exchange for easier recovery.” But in

15 In the spirit of Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, we consider procedure not only as a “property” regime, in which a party must bargain to a price with a
seller, but also possibly as a “liability” regime, in which parties may unilaterally invoke
procedure, but the court sets prices for doing so. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L
Rev 1089, 1105–06 (1972).
16 The context is multidistrict litigation (MDL), and they are not called “procedural
markets.” They are called “Plaintiffs’ Steering Committees.” See Part III.B.2.
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literally thousands of civil cases in federal court every year,
judges set pleading standards far above the plausibility pleading
standard under Rule 8(a)(2) but then facilitate settlement payments from defendants to those plaintiffs whose pleadings survive. (And the plaintiffs’ attorneys go along with this.)17
And of course, courts don’t label what they are doing as “auctioning” juicy procedural entitlements to plaintiffs’ lawyers—oh,
wait. Never mind. They do. (And yes, defense attorneys go along
with this.)18
These private bargains and court orders need to be recognized for what they are—innovations in procedural flexibility—
and evaluated as such. By identifying the full spectrum of procedural flexibility, we provide the framework for understanding
how judge and party control over procedure is evolving, even in
ways that the statutes and Rules governing procedure do not
acknowledge.
Our project necessarily raises normative and policy questions: Are current approaches to procedural flexibility suited to
the goals of the civil justice system? Would radical reshaping of
procedural flexibility improve access to justice or quash it? Would
it reduce the cost of litigation? Could it accelerate the resolution
of cases? Would it increase or reduce inequalities within the system? Could it reverse the flow of cases out of court and into
arbitration?
These questions require sustained treatment. In the present
Article, although we focus on transforming the descriptive framework for procedural flexibility, we also begin the project of normatively evaluating the more radical forms of flexibility. In
Part IV, we argue that nothing in the full range of procedural flexibility—even more radical options like markets in procedure—is
clearly ruled out as a normative matter by the criteria most often
invoked by the existing literature on procedural flexibility. These
criteria include facilitating dispute resolution and norm creation.
Neither is anything ruled out by concerns about democratic participation, commodification, and distributive justice.

17 It is not called “raising pleading standards.” It is called “issuing a Lone Pine order.”
Again, the context is MDL. See Part III.B.2.
18 See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 FRD 71, 78–82 (SDNY 2000)
(reviewing history of courts using reverse auctions to select class counsel in class actions).
See also Part III.B.1.
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To be clear, we make no claim that more flexibility is better,
and it would be premature in this Article to claim that any specific form of procedural flexibility is good policy. But we do argue
that, just as traditional descriptive criteria fail to account for the
current complexity of procedural flexibility, traditional normative
criteria fail to provide adequate guidance for future procedural
reform. Hence, we end this Article with a call for a more ambitious
normative theory of procedure.19
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Core/Non-Core Paradigm
The idea that procedural rights can or should be modified by
parties to a lawsuit has recently been examined by scholars in
both criminal20 and civil21 contexts. Practitioners, however, have

19 We take up this challenge in a work in progress, in which we seek to develop a
comprehensive normative framework for evaluating procedure that can unpack the policy
implications of the full spectrum of procedural flexibility. See Ronen Avraham and
William H.J. Hubbard, Civil Procedure as the Regulation of Externalities (unpublished
working paper 2020).
20 See, for example, John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U Chi L
Rev 181, 193 (2015) (proposing to abandon the all-or-nothing choice between a guilty plea
and a full-blown jury trial); Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating
the Standard of Proof, 97 J Crim L & Crimin 943, 944–45 & n 6 (2007) (proposing a negotiable standard of proof and flagging, but not developing, the possibility of additional unbundled bargains); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Counsel’s Role in Bargaining for Trials, 99 Iowa
L Rev 1979, 1982, 1988–92 (2014) (suggesting three bargains that a defense counsel could
propose to simplify a trial in exchange for some guaranteed leniency for the defendant);
Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 Iowa L Rev 609, 622–23 (2016) (similar);
Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 NY L Sch L Rev 1009, 1011 (2011) (proposing a mechanism by which defendants “waive major procedural rights at trial, in return for important
procedural advantages on post-conviction review”). See also Nancy Jean King, Priceless
Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L Rev 113, 118–19, 124
(1999) (identifying the bargaining aspect of some stipulations and waivers and suggesting
that “the market for some rights may yet emerge”); Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, 40 J Legal Stud 273, 282–92 (2011) (suggesting the potential utility of permitting defendants to waive double jeopardy protection against retrial
after acquittal).
21 See, for example, Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules
Through Party Choice, 90 Tex L Rev 1329, 1382 (2012) (documenting various ways in
which parties make their own procedural rules and the normative concerns they might
raise); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 Va L Rev 723, 783
(2011) (exploring limits on the enforcement of procedural contracts, particularly when they
conflict with substantive, nonwaivable legal rights and obligations); Michael L. Moffitt,
Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 Geo Wash L
Rev 461, 467–91 (2007) (proposing to conceptualize the rules of civil procedure as default
rules that can and should be modified to suit the needs of each case); Scott Dodson, Party

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140585

892

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:883

been modifying procedure all along,22 and such control over procedure has been on the rise as traditional hostility to party control
over procedure has disappeared from doctrine.23 As scholars have
noted, parties may agree on the state in which they will litigate
their dispute24 and on the law which would govern their dispute,25
even when that state’s laws otherwise could not. 26 They may
agree to waive various evidence objections, such as the right to
object on hearsay grounds, in return for their opponent doing the
same27 or for some other favor. 28 They may waive claims about
Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 37 (2014) (framing parties as
subordinate to the law and judicial authority, and suggesting limitations on procedural
customization); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U Ill L Rev 389,
402–16 (noting a lack of evidence that parties commonly develop bespoke procedural rules
through private agreement); Daphna Kapeliuk and Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 Tex L Rev 1475,
1485–91 (2013) (arguing that the public implications of private procedural agreements
must be analyzed not only from the ex post but also the ex ante perspective—that is, before
disputes arise); Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 Mich L Rev 1191, 1203–18 (2011)
(noting the possible benefits to litigants and courts of agreements stipulating facts and
extending this reasoning to stipulations of law); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 NYU L Rev 514, 570 (2009) (advocating “procedural optionality”—that is, modification of procedural rules through private
agreement—as a means of reducing frivolous litigation).
22 The earliest example of negotiation over procedure—the standard of proof in particular—that we could think of is when Abraham argued with God about the standard
required for condemning the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah to destruction. See Genesis
18:16–33. It is not clear that Abraham counts as a practitioner, however!
23 See Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 BU L Rev 127, 133 (2018).
24 See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 493 (cited in note 21); Hoffman, 2014 U Ill L
Rev at 408 (cited in note 21).
25 Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 493 (cited in note 21); Hoffman, 2014 U Ill L Rev at
427 (cited in note 21).
26 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 & cmt f (noting circumstances
under which contractual parties may choose the law of a state “with which the contract
has no substantial relationship”). Further, forum-selection clauses are commonly viewed
as virtual choice-of-law clauses because the ability to choose a forum often converges with
choosing the substantive law that would apply. See, for example, Allstate Insurance Co v
Hague, 449 US 302, 320 (1981) (finding that a Minnesota court could apply Minnesota
law, even though the action was brought against a Wisconsin resident and arose out of
events in Wisconsin).
27 For a discussion by a court (though in a criminal case) of parties’ ability to waive
evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule, see United States v Mezzanatto, 513 US 196,
202 (1995).
28 See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the
Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 Ariz St L J 471, 518–19 (2013) (discussing mixed
judicial responses to attempts by parties to contractually waive rules of evidence). Judges,
especially in federal court, often strongly “encourage” parties to agree on resolving evidentiary disputes, and they discourage tactics by one party that force the other party to jump
through the hoops sometimes required to get evidence admitted when the only purpose of
doing so is to waste the other party’s time and efforts. Courts, however, tend to relax the
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statutes of limitations, 29 craft their own jury instructions, 30 or
even totally waive their right to a jury trial.31 In fact, parties may
completely waive their right for a day in court by agreeing, even
in advance, to arbitrate their dispute if it ever emerges.32 They
may agree to limit the number of witnesses or the timeline, form,
and content of discovery.33 Parties may even agree to forego their
appeal rights, not only as a part of a settlement agreement, but
also in advance.34 And so on. Parties can agree on waiving or trading many rights besides these granted to them by the legal
system.
Of course, the power of the parties to alter by agreement the
procedure governing their dispute is not unlimited. Parties cannot agree that the judge will decide the case by flipping coins,35
stipulate that the judge will not give reasons for her decision,36 or
change the standards by which the judge will review another adjudicator’s decision.37 This poses the question of which procedural
rights can be altered and which cannot. The literature has framed
this question in the following way: Which procedures are sufficiently central to courts’ missions that they form a “core” set

rules of evidence more in bench trials than in jury trials because, in bench trials, there is
no concern that jurors might go astray. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J
Disp Resol 181, 203.
29 Parties can shorten an applicable statute of limitations by agreement if the shorter
period is reasonable, though “[m]any judges . . . are uncomfortable with changing statutes
of limitations that they perceive as fair.” Paulson, 45 Ariz St L J at 498 (cited in note 28).
Some courts prohibit the enforcement of contractual statutes of limitations altogether. See
id at 499. Parties are less free to lengthen a statute of limitations, since lengthening it
increases the risk of stale claims. See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1347–48 (cited in note 21);
Paulson, 45 Ariz St L J at 499 (cited in note 28).
30 See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 501–02 (cited in note 21).
31 See id at 494; Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1348 (cited in note 21); Paulson, 45 Ariz St L
J at 488, 490 (cited in note 28); Thornburg, 2006 J Disp Resol at 185 (cited in note 28);
Kevin E. Davis and Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev
507, 517 (2011).
32 See Thornburg, 2006 J Disp Resol at 193 (cited in note 28).
33 See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 500 (cited in note 21). See also FRCP 29(b),
which requires the court’s approval when parties agree to extend the time for any form of
discovery. This probably reflects an attempt to control the externality on the court.
34 See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1351 (cited in note 28).
35 See id at 1384–85.
36 See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 505–07 (cited in note 21) (suggesting that the
public would resist agreements that impede the clear articulation of the law and publicity
of court proceedings).
37 See Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, 552 US 576, 578 (2008) (holding that
parties’ agreement cannot change the district court’s standard of review of an arbitral
award under the Federal Arbitration Act).
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of procedures that cannot be altered by contract between the
parties?38
This literature traces its roots back to the work of Professor
Lon Fuller and the Legal Process School, 39 which attempted to
distill the essential characteristics of adjudication. Fuller described adjudication as “a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human
affairs.”40
The concept of the core has been most fully articulated in
recent work by Professor Robert Bone, which focuses on defining
the core of procedural rights.41 Bone focuses on legitimacy—as distinct from concerns about economic efficiency, party autonomy, or
party equality—as the key explanatory factor, both descriptively
and normatively, for preserving a core of procedural rights
that cannot be altered by party agreement. 42 These rights are
the “core” of procedure, in the sense that they are essential to
adjudication.43
Several other scholars have emphasized legitimacy as well.
They note that the public perception of the courts is likely to be

38 Some scholars take this framing as given and distinguish further between types
of contracts that parties to a dispute can use to alter procedure by agreement. Daphna
Kapeliuk and Professor Alon Klement highlight the significance of the timing of the contract: the distinction between predispute (ex ante) and postdispute (ex post) procedural
contracts. According to Kapeliuk and Klement, evaluating procedural contracts solely
from an ex-post perspective—when they are already enforced in litigation—neglects some
important features and effects of predispute contracts. For example, a clause that seems
costly, such as one allowing broad discovery, can incentivize parties to settle, so it would
never actually be enforced. The same distinction holds importance when evaluating the
implications of the contract’s institutional legitimacy. See Kapeliuk and Klement, 91 Tex
L Rev at 1490 (cited in note 21).
39 See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv L Rev
353 (1978); Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law (Foundation 1958); Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law
Models of Litigation, 75 BU L Rev 1273 (1995). See also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 BU L Rev
485, 509–10 (2003); William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship
and Pedagogy in the Post–Legal Process Era, 48 U Pitt L Rev 691, 694 (1987).
40 Fuller, 92 Harv L Rev at 366 (cited in note 39).
41 See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1385–91 (cited in note 21). For a response to Bone that
emphasizes that many seemingly problematic provisions may be useful to promoting settlement while rarely implicating legitimacy concerns, see Kapeliuk and Klement, 91 Tex
L Rev at 1486–87 (cited in note 21). For closely related arguments in the criminal procedure context, see Rappaport, 82 U Chi L Rev at 194–95 (cited in note 20); Fisher, 97 J
Crim L & Crimin at 977 (cited in note 20).
42 See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1378, 1384–94 (cited in note 21).
43 Id at 1384–85.
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shaped by the perception that court decision-making is fair because it employs broadly applicable, consistently applied procedures that can benefit all parties.44 In contrast, Bone focuses not
on perceived legitimacy but on normative legitimacy by arguing
about what elements should comprise the core of adjudication because they preserve the legitimate operation of the institution.45
He concludes that the core is defined in terms of courts’ commitment to reasoning from general principles to decide cases based
on their particular facts.46 This leads him to exclude from the core
procedures such as pleading rules, joinder rules, discovery rules,
summary judgment rules, and evidence rules.47 But he includes
in the core rules defining the decision-making body, ensuring judicial impartiality, guiding the reasoning process for the decision
maker, and creating appeal rights. 48 More generally, he distinguishes between rules that regulate the conduct of parties and
those that regulate the decision-making process of the judge.49
To illustrate something clearly within the core, Bone uses the
example of deciding a case by flipping a coin. He notes the strong
intuition that this would be wrong, even if the parties genuinely
consent to it and its attendant risks, even if it surely would be a
cost-saving method of dispute resolution, and even if (let us suppose) the resolution of the particular case would have no negative
effects on third parties.50
Bone then addresses the question of why we ought to prevent
the parties from agreeing to different core procedures even if no
third parties are harmed. His worry here is the effect on the
norms that define judging and ensure that judges preserve certain approaches to judicial decision-making.51 Chipping away at a
universal norm of reasoned decision-making and judicial reputations built upon this skill, Bone cautions, would undermine the

44 See Davis and Hershkoff, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev at 547–48 (cited in note 31);
Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 480–81 (cited in note 21); Thornburg, 2006 J Disp Resol at
209–10 (cited in note 28).
45 Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1378–79 (cited in note 21).
46 Id at 1385–88.
47 Id at 1393.
48 Id.
49 Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1393–94 (cited in note 21).
50 Id at 1379–80.
51 Id at 1394–95.
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internalization of these norms among judges engaging in adjudication.52 But what is the mission (or missions) that adjudication
is to achieve?
Closely related to Fuller and Bone is the work of Professors
Judith Resnik and Michael Moffitt. Resnik sees the essential feature of judging as engaging in public reasoning about the application of law to facts.53 Like Bone, Resnik sees the legitimacy of
the courts as dependent on judges fulfilling this role.54 Moffitt is
more explicit about the relationship between the essential features of adjudication and the missions it is to achieve. Moffitt
couches the public interest in litigation in terms of two core functions of courts—resolving disputes and producing rules and precedents (that is, norm creation). 55 Moffitt rules out party agreements that would interfere with these functions by, for example,
preventing the resolution of a dispute or eliminating a reasoned
explanation from a judgment.56
B. Limitations of the Core/Non-Core Paradigm
Although different scholars have offered different articulations of the core functions of courts, we see broad agreement over
their general contours. Adjudication by a judge lends finality to
the resolution of a dispute. 57 This is the dispute-resolution
function of courts. A judge’s decision must be reached through a
52

Id at 1396–97.
See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 Notre Dame L Rev 593,
623–24 (2005).
54 Id. See also Paulson, 45 Ariz St L J at 475–76, 527–30 (cited in note 28) (characterizing a procedural contract as a joint petition for the court to modify its rules, and
proposing that courts require judicial control over decision-making, among other conditions, before implementing the terms of the contract).
55 See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 505–07 (cited in note 21).
56 Id. Of course, concerns about legitimacy are not the only reasons why courts would,
or should, reject party agreements to modify procedure. Scholars have noted that even
outside the core, parties cannot agree to a procedure that impairs parties’ ability to bring
claims to vindicate federal rights. See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1382–83 (cited in note 21);
Dodge, 97 Va L Rev at 786–87 (cited in note 21). This concern has become acute in the
wake of American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 US 228 (2013), a case that
directly pitted party control over procedure—albeit in arbitration—against the effective
vindication of rights under federal antitrust law. Nor should courts be able to enforce party
contracts that reflect a one-sided agreement—a civil procedure species of unconscionability. See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1382–83 (cited in note 21); Paulson, 45 Ariz St L J at 475–
76, 527–30 (cited in note 28). Scholars have also cautioned against agreements that unjustifiably affect the rights of third parties or increase the burdens on courts, which would
increase court congestion and taxpayer expense. See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1382–83 (cited
in note 21); Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 478–83 (cited in note 21).
57 See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 506 (cited in note 21).
53
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process of reasoned application of law to facts,58 and the judge’s
decision provides guidance about the law to the public and future
judges.59 This is the norm-creation function of courts. The core is
characterized by procedures central to the norm-creation role of
courts, while the non-core includes procedures tied to the disputeresolution function of courts, which relates more to the facts of
the individual case than to the rules that courts announce.
At a high level of generality, these principles allow one to sort
most procedures into or out of the core. How the judge renders
opinions, the governing substantive law, and the availability or
unavailability of further review is largely beyond the control
of the parties. Other types of procedures, however, are open to
adjustment.
This approach to defining the core can indeed apply to cases
involving parties’ contracts that attempt to modify procedure. As
we’ve noted, flipping coins to decide a case generates easy intuitions about what parties cannot make a judge do. It easily fits
within both the need for reasoning and the value of precedent as
aspects of the core. This approach to defining the core also explains hard cases like Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc,60
in which two sophisticated businesses entered into a carefully negotiated agreement that expanded the power of the district court
to review the award of the arbitrator to whom they referred their
dispute. Their agreement did not diminish the power of the court;
instead, it replaced a deferential standard of review under the
Federal Arbitration Act61 with a de novo review of the arbitrator’s
legal interpretations.62 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that
this was not within the parties’ power.63

58

See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1379 (cited in note 21).
See Moffitt, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 506 (cited in note 21).
60 552 US 576 (2008).
61 43 Stat 883 (1925), codified as amended at 9 USC § 1 et seq. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), a court must confirm an arbitral award even if the award was based
on erroneous legal standards. See 9 USC § 10 (permitting vacatur of arbitral awards only
for arbitrator partiality, corruption, or “other misbehavior,” but not for errors of law).
62 Hall Street Associates, 552 US at 580.
63 Id at 590. In reaching this result, the Court concluded that the text of the FAA’s
provisions for judicial confirmation of arbitral awards “carries no hint of flexibility.” Id at
587. The Court left open the possibility, however, that such alterations to procedure might
be within the District Court’s power to manage litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See id at 591–92. This, too, may be consistent with the concept of the core, at
least to the extent that it dictates only what parties may not alter, not what is unalterable
altogether.
59
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The core/non-core binary is simple and elegant. But it suffers
from limitations that, in our view, highlight the need for a richer
descriptive and normative account of procedural flexibility.
We note three tensions that arise in the simple core/non-core
framework:
First, the claim that the core protects the norm-creation process of courts from party control may be less robust than assumed.
In some important respects, party agreements can control the legal standards applied by the court. Courts enforce choice-of-law
clauses in contracts (albeit, only to the extent that the claims are
contractual in nature). 64 They also vigorously enforce forumselection agreements,65 and although dictating the forum does not
formally dictate the governing law, as a practical matter it often
does.66 Thus, with choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses, the
parties are, in effect, choosing the legal rules that the court will
apply. They may even choose to burden a court with the task of
applying the law of another jurisdiction, which imposes greater
decision-making costs on the court even as it lowers the precedential value of the court’s decision. Why aren’t choice of law and
choice of forum within the core? Indeed, although such a notion
seems exotic today, historically this was not always the case. 67
Second, a key rationale for defining a core of procedure is that
the reasoned decision-making process of courts should not be altered because a uniform approach to judicial decision-making inculcates norms essential to the proper functioning of the courts.68
It is certainly true that judges (and therefore the system as a

64 See, for example, Finance One Public Co Ltd v Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc, 414 F3d 325, 335 (2d Cir 2005) (holding that “extra-contractual setoff rights fall
outside the scope” of choice-of-law clauses).
65 See, for example, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v Shute, 499 US 585 (1991). Enforcement does depend, however, on the extent to which the forum chosen falls within broad
limits of reasonableness. See id at 593 (discussing the “reasonableness” inquiry that the
Court has used to determine whether forum-selection clauses are enforceable).
66 See, for example, Allstate, 449 US at 320 (finding no due process violation when a
Minnesota court applied Minnesota law to an action by a Wisconsin resident against a
Wisconsin resident arising out of events in Wisconsin and an insurance policy held in
Wisconsin).
67 Historically, courts often held contractual choice-of-forum clauses unenforceable
at common law. See, for example, The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 US 1, 9 (1972)
(“Forum-selection clauses have historically not been favored by American courts.”). The
law of choice of law and personal jurisdiction tended to follow strict territorial rules; the
canonical case on premodern personal jurisdiction is Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714 (1877)
(describing the general rule that a court can exercise jurisdiction only over persons physically within the territory of the sovereign).
68 See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1390 (cited in note 21).
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whole) benefit from habituation into certain modes of decisionmaking based on reasoning and deliberation. Further, the uniformity of the modes of decision and the standards applied has a
public-good quality. It is easier for consumers of judicial opinions
to digest their holdings when background norms for those decisions are common across cases.
But as a descriptive matter, is judicial decision-making uniform? Even in the absence of attempts to contractually modify
procedure, variety, not uniformity, is the norm in court procedure.
As Professor Alexandra Lahav has documented in detail, civil procedure is far less standardized than textbook accounts indicate.69
Often, modes of judicial reasoning are not even governed by articulated, let alone uniform, norms. To answer the same legal question, different judges—or even the same judge in different cases—
may require briefing, or not; may require oral argument, or not;
may raise issues sua sponte, or not; may consider facts outside
the record, or not; may rely on clerks to draft a judgment, or not;
may rule from the bench, or only after deliberation; may rule
orally, or with a written opinion; may designate the opinion for
publication, or not; may write a long opinion, or a short one; may
use a style suited to an audience of lawyers, or to a lay audience.70
Some of these distinctions go to the heart of what it means for a
process to be adversarial or to be participatory, and some go to
the heart of what it means for a decision to be reasoned or to be
public. None of these distinctions is uniform.
Third, even as a normative matter, the sharp distinction between the core and the non-core may be problematic. To put methods of judicial reasoning to assure optimal norm creation on one
side of the line and elaboration of facts by the parties to assure
optimal dispute resolution for the specific parties on the other side
of the line may disserve the interdependence between the two. We
might think that the legitimacy of the court and the public value
of the court’s opinions are undermined if the court rests its decision upon a dubious stipulation of facts by the parties.71 And lawyers seem to believe that better facts make for better law, given
69

See generally Lahav, 71 Vand L Rev 821 (cited in note 12).
See Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 287–315 (Harvard 2013) (describing
some of the challenges that confront district judges and the various practical decisions
they must make to address them).
71 To be sure, parties have an ethical duty of candor to the court. See, for example,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (ABA 2018). Our claim is not that parties
necessarily stipulate to falsehoods, but that the quality of the factual premises for a
judicial decision may be low because the parties agreed that careful investigation and
70
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the care with which lawyers filing impact litigation select their
test cases. Indeed, the distinction between what counts as a factual claim and what counts as a legal conclusion is a famously
slippery one in other contexts.72
A full-blown normative theory for procedural flexibility is beyond the scope of this Article. But the observations above indicate
that, just as there is a need for a richer descriptive account of procedural flexibility, there is also a need for a richer normative account. In this Article, we provide this new descriptive account,
mindful that it lays the groundwork for a new normative account
to come.
II. THE SPECTRUM OF PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY
As we saw in the previous Part, existing scholarship draws a
distinction between a “core” of procedures, which no one can modify, and a “non-core” of procedures, which the parties to a case
may modify by contract, subject to some qualifications. In this
way, existing scholarship has taken an all-or-nothing approach to
the core: there are two types of flexibility, core (judge control) and
non-core (party control), and there are two types of procedure, in
the core and out of the core. But as we will show in this Part, there
is a spectrum of procedural flexibility that contains many different possibilities for allocating control over procedure. Within the
core, there can be more flexibility or less—the amount of judicial
flexibility varies across procedures. Outside the core, there are
many configurations of the judge and one or both parties, who, by
agreement, can modify procedure in a given case.

presentation of facts was not in their mutual interest. Of course, it is also possible that a
stipulation may be known to be factually false. In her monograph on the interbellum Constitution, Professor Alison LaCroix colorfully documents how a significant Commerce
Clause case, Willson v Black Bird Creek Marsh Co, 27 US (2 Pet) 245 (1829), rested on a
stipulation that was “a fictionalized account of the crucial facts of the case.” Alison LaCroix,
The Interbellum Constitution: Union, Commerce, and Slavery from the Long Founding Moment to the Civil War (Yale forthcoming). For a more recent example of what may have
been a collusive stipulation used to generate a court decision with potentially binding effect on nonparticipants in the lawsuit, see generally Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32 (1940).
72 See, for example, Elizabeth Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114 Penn St L Rev
Penn Statim 1, 3–4 (2010); Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under
the Codes, 21 Colum L Rev 416, 417 (1921) (arguing that there is no logical distinction
between statements categorized by courts as “statements of fact” and “conclusions of law”).
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A. Breaking Up the Core and Non-Core
As we just noted, conventional wisdom assumed two categories of procedural flexibility: one where the parties cannot modify
procedure through mutual agreement—this category is the “core”
of procedure—and one where parties can control procedure
through contracts between themselves. However, a more complete view of procedural flexibility reveals that these categories
are just two points along a spectrum. Figure 1 begins to illustrate
a more complete picture of the range of options for assigning control over procedure to actors in the system.
Viewed within this spectrum, we see that the core/non-core
distinction reflects attention to two sections of the larger spectrum. The core, where parties have no ability to alter procedural
defaults, occupies the left end of the spectrum, and mutual party
agreements to alter procedural defaults sit at the middle of the
spectrum.
FIGURE 1: A SPECTRUM OF FLEXIBILITY
→ Increasing Flexibility
No
Flex

Judge
Control

Judge and
Party Control

Mutual
Party
Control

Unilateral
Party
Control

...

This spectrum does not merely list theoretical possibilities.
Current procedure is chock-full of examples of every one of these
forms of procedural flexibility. (And we have left space at the right
end of the spectrum to introduce, in Part III, new forms involving
even greater flexibility.) In the sections below, we describe the
points along the spectrum and document examples of procedural
flexibility from the Federal Rules, statutes, and case law for each.
1. No flex.
On the far left, no one has discretion. As a formal matter,
there is no flexibility at all. As a practical matter, the judge has
whatever wiggle room doctrine provides, but nothing else. The canonical example of this is federal subject matter jurisdiction,
which neither the parties nor the court have any freedom to waive
or alter by agreement.
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The central principle governing appellate jurisdiction in the
federal courts is likewise inflexible: the “final judgment rule” in
essence requires that all activity in a case short of execution of
the judgment be complete before a party may appeal a decision of
the district court.73 Even the collateral order doctrine, a gloss on
the final judgment rule that allows certain interlocutory decisions
to be treated as final judgments, gives no discretion to judges or
parties.74
Indeed, this “no flex” category appears in all facets of civil
procedure. Our survey of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that most of the Rules, either in part or in whole, create
inflexible rules. This is unsurprising, insofar as there must be
some basic “rules of the game” that serve as a fixed reference
point for all litigants.75 Thus, many Rules governing what activities count as civil litigation (answer: a “civil action”76), what begins litigation (answer: “filing a complaint with the court”77), and
how to go about doing that (answer: by, among other things, making “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief ” 78 ) are expressed as no-flex rules.
Other Rules governing the inclusion of additional claims or
parties in a single action likewise contain many inflexible
requirements.79
Despite the apparent abundance of no-flex rules, the Rules
on the whole reflect a commitment to party-driven procedure in
which the court takes a passive role, acting only in response to
motions. This commitment bakes discretion into procedure, even
when it is not made explicit. For example, Rule 8(a)(2) requires
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” This is stated as a no-flex rule. There
is no reference to discretion of the judge and no proviso, “unless
the parties agree otherwise.” But there is still a sense in which
the parties could agree to a lower bar for pleading: the Rules do
not obligate the defendant to file a motion to dismiss, and the

73

See, for example, Mohawk Industries, Inc v Carpenter, 558 US 100, 106–07 (2009).
Id.
75 FRCP 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts . . . .”).
76 FRCP 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
77 FRCP 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”).
78 FRCP 8(a)(2). See also FRCP 4 and 4.1 (governing service of process and summons); FRCP 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 (governing form and content of pleadings).
79 See, for example, FRCP 13, 15(c), 19(c), 23(a)–(b), 24 (governing joinder of claims
and parties, misjoinder, class certification, and intervention).
74
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court need not act in the absence of such a motion.80 Thus, procedural rigidity is not absolute even for threshold questions governing the making of a civil claim. Further, note that there is nothing
inevitable about the degree of flexibility or rigidity here. The
Rules could, for example, obligate the court to act sua sponte to
dismiss inadequate pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2).81
Nor is this an isolated example. The law often intermingles
procedural flexibility and inflexibility. As noted above, the final
judgment rule is a no-flex rule. But as we shall see below, jurisdictional statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
exceptions that permit interlocutory appeals, which are expressly
based on the exercise of discretion by parties and judges.82 And
while parties cannot create federal subject matter jurisdiction by
agreement (this is explicitly forbidden by statute83), parties can
agree to resolve their cases before other tribunals, even when
their disputes fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts.84 Indeed, in some limited instances, plaintiffs can
unilaterally exercise discretion to stay out of federal court.85 So
although parties cannot flex into federal court, they can flex out.
Thus, while this Section has highlighted areas of procedure
with no-flex rules, it also shows that drawing lines between a core
of inflexible procedure and a non-core of flexible procedure is not

80 More radically, though, could the parties agree to a higher bar at the pleading
stage, perhaps in exchange for allowing the plaintiff a broader scope of discovery or a lower
bar at summary judgment? Could the judge unilaterally raise the pleading standard?
Nothing in Rule 12 suggests this is possible, and Supreme Court precedent from other
contexts indicates that the answer is no. See Hall Street Associates, 552 US at 592–93
(holding that parties’ agreement cannot change the district court’s standard of review of
an arbitral award under the FAA). But stay tuned. We return to these questions later. See
Part III.
81 See FRCP 12(b). Note that the court is always under an obligation to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FRCP 12(h)(3).
82 See Part II.A.3 (discussing FRCP 54(b) and 28 USC § 1292(b)).
83 See 28 USC § 1359.
84 Absent a statute vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, parties are
free to agree to litigate in state court or through alternative dispute resolution, such as
arbitration, which is expressly endorsed by the FAA. See 9 USC § 1 et seq.
85 In a case arising under state law but potentially within the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts, an individual plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading or
stipulating to damages below the amount necessary to create federal jurisdiction. This is
an application of what is called the “St. Paul Mercury rule.” See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co v Red Cab Co, 303 US 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule governing dismissal for want of
jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different
rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good
faith.”).
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so simple. The rigidity of rules governing subject matter jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction might seem to imply jurisdiction is
at the core of procedure, but even here we see a commingling of
no-flex and various forms of flexibility.
2. Judge control.
Moving right in Figure 1, we encounter the first of many
forms of procedural flexibility: judge control. Judge control means
that the judge (but only the judge) has discretion to deviate from
defaults. In the prior core/non-core framework, this would still
count as part of the core of procedure because the parties cannot
exercise control through contract. Examples include certain categories of appeals, which a court has discretion to allow or deny.
Such discretion is familiar in the context of certiorari to the US
Supreme Court, but it is also a part of everyday litigation. For
example, a district court judge may designate certain judgments
to be final (and thus immediately appealable) in multiparty actions when such judgments would otherwise be nonfinal (and
thus not immediately appealable).86
Our survey of the Rules documents many instances of judicial
discretion to set procedural requirements. Examples include judicial discretion to change requirements governing service and
pleading, including obviating requirements for service on all defendants and adding or subtracting requirements for responsive
pleadings.87 The court also has broad discretion to revise the default deadlines and dates set by the Rules;88 to schedule and manage conferences, hearings, and trial;89 and even to change the configuration of parties.90 The court’s unilateral discretion extends to
matters governing whether the case ends or continues: the judge
has discretion to enter summary judgment sua sponte and on
grounds not raised by the parties,91 and the court can order a new
86

See FRCP 54(b).
See, for example, FRCP 5(c)(1) (permitting the court sua sponte to waive the requirement of serving pleadings on all defendants and to deem all crossclaims denied).
88 See, for example, FRCP 5.1(c), 6, 12(a)(4), 15(a)(3), 56(b) (giving the court discretion to extend time).
89 See, for example, FRCP 16 (giving the court discretion to call pretrial conferences);
FRCP 20(b) (permitting the court to set separate trials in multiparty actions); FRCP 26(f)
(giving the court discretion over discovery management conferences); FRCP 47 (governing
examination of prospective jurors).
90 See, for example, FRCP 19(a)(2) (realigning parties); FRCP 21 (permitting the
court to sever parties or claims); FRCP 42 (giving the court discretion to consolidate or
separate actions).
91 FRCP 56(f).
87
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trial sua sponte after entry of judgment on a jury verdict. 92 As
noted above, a district judge has discretion to enter a final judgment with respect to one or more claims in a multiclaim or multiparty action.93 And, as one would expect, the court always has discretion to inquire into and sanction misconduct.94
3. Judge and party control.
Next is the segment of the spectrum where the judge and the
parties together share the power to flex the rules. This form of
procedural flexibility is, within the core/non-core framework, still
in the core, insofar as it requires judicial approval. Parties cannot
modify procedure on their own.
The stricter variety of flexibility here requires agreement of
both parties and of the judge. This form of flexibility is less common, but one can nonetheless find examples throughout the Federal Rules. An example would be empaneling a jury to issue a
binding (that is, nonadvisory) verdict in a case where there is no
right to a civil trial by jury.95 Similarly, trial before a magistrate
judge requires the consent of the district judge and the parties.96
Another example is the requirement of a judicial order to enforce
“clawback” agreements against third parties that protect parties
from waiver of attorney-client privilege due to inadvertent disclosure of documents in litigation.97 Class-wide settlement of claims
also falls into this category,98 and although the practice is not explicitly authorized by the Rules, judges in some multidistrict litigations have required judicial approval of mass settlements as
well.99
The looser variety of flexibility here is more common and requires agreement of the judge and only one of the parties.100 There
92

FRCP 59(d).
FRCP 54(b).
94 See FRCP 11 (governing non-discovery-related filings with the court); FRCP 16(f)
(governing failing to appear at a pretrial conference); FRCP 37 (governing discoveryrelated filings with the court); FRCP 56(h) (governing summary judgment).
95 See FRCP 39(c)(2).
96 FRCP 73(a).
97 See FRE 502(e).
98 See FRCP 23(e). See also FRCP 23.1(c) (requiring court approval of settlements in
derivative actions).
99 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 NYU L Rev
71, 85 (2015); Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of
the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 Cal L Rev 1259, 1298–1301 (2017).
100 The court-and-one-party structure of court action is ubiquitous. When a party files
a motion and the court grants it, this is essentially the court and one party agreeing to
93
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are countless ways in which parties and courts exercise this form
of flexibility, given that courts are granted broad discretion to regulate procedure to the extent that statutes and Rules do not otherwise specify,101 and the Rules place no rigid limits on what a
party can request by motion.102 Examples include party requests
to act outside of a deadline imposed by the Rules,103 requests to
the Court of Appeals to hear an interlocutory appeal,104 and motions for the court to exercise its discretion to require amended or
additional pleadings105 or to change venue.106
4. Mutual party control.
Moving further to the right we get to mutual party control.
This has been the subject of most past academic attention on procedural flexibility. It is the realm in which party agreement can
alter default rules without court involvement and potentially
even against the court’s will. This is the “non-core” that the literature contrasts with the “core” of fundamental procedures that
the parties cannot modify by agreement. Thus, this portion of the
spectrum maps neatly onto the existing core/non-core paradigm.
But even here, a close look at doctrine and practice complicates
the intuition that the core (and not the non-core) includes features
of litigation that go to the essence of judicial decision-making or
its perceived legitimacy.
For example, party agreement—with little or no say in the
matter by a judge—can play a decisive role even in deciding which
court will hear a case or whether a court will resolve the dispute
something, but it is important to distinguish when this sequence of events involves procedural flexibility as opposed to something else. Procedural flexibility is when a party and
the court both have discretion to change procedure away from a default, not when one or
both of the judge and the party are not exercising discretion or changing procedural defaults. Further discussion on these forms of motion practice is outside the scope of this
Article.
101 See FRCP 83(b) (“A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with
federal law . . . .”).
102 See FRCP 7(b) (outlining requirements for motions in terms of minimal formal
requirements but no substantive limits).
103 See, for example, FRCP 14(a) (allowing extension of time for third-party claims
with “the court’s leave”); FRCP 51(a)(2) (allowing untimely requests for jury instructions).
See also FRCP 6(b) (stating general rules governing extending time).
104 See FRCP 23(f) (discretionary appeal of class certification decision); 28 USC
§ 1292(b) (discretionary interlocutory appeal requiring assent of both district and appellate courts).
105 See FRCP 12(e) and 15 (clarifying and amending or supplementing pleadings,
respectively).
106 See 28 USC § 1404.
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at all. Parties can agree or consent to a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction.107 Arbitration agreements are, as a general matter,
enforceable.108 Again as a general matter, parties can, by contract,
select the court that will serve as the forum for their dispute and,
at least in contract disputes, the law that court will apply. 109 As a
practical matter, parties can choose their court, maybe even the
decision-maker, and then tell the judge (or arbitrator) which law
to apply. Few procedural choices are more essential or consequential for legal decision-making than these.
Further, the Rules require a unanimous verdict returned by
a jury of no fewer than six jurors—unless the parties stipulate
otherwise.110 Doesn’t the difference between a unanimous verdict
of twelve jurors and a verdict by a bare majority of two-out-ofthree jurors affect the perceived legitimacy of the judgment? And
of course, in most cases, the parties can settle their dispute and
terminate the litigation without any input from the court other
than the judge’s rubber stamp of an agreed order to dismiss
the case.111
Our earlier discussion of the no-flex zone remarked that inflexibility and flexibility often coexist in the same areas of procedure, undermining the theory that some areas of procedure belong in a core that is immune to alteration by agreement. Here,
we see the other side of the same coin: party agreement playing a
decisive role in procedures that implicate the legitimate authority
of the court (personal jurisdiction and jury verdicts) and the capacity of courts to create, interpret, and modify legal norms (arbitration agreements and choice-of-law clauses).112

107 See, for example, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro, 564 US 873, 880 (2011)
(noting “explicit consent” as a basis for general personal jurisdiction).
108 See 9 USC § 2.
109 See, for example, Shute, 499 US at 595 (holding forum-selection clause presumptively valid under federal law); Volt Information Sciences, Inc v Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University, 489 US 468, 476 (1989) (rejecting a challenge to choice-of-law
clause in context of arbitration agreement). There are ways of further fine-tuning the
choice of judge beyond selection of the specific court, too. For example, if there is one judge
that a party would like to avoid in the courthouse it would otherwise prefer, that party
can hire a relative of that judge as a member of its legal team, in order to induce the judge
to recuse herself.
110 FRCP 48(b).
111 See FRCP 41(a)(1) (governing voluntary dismissal by party agreement and noting
exceptions to the general rule permitting settlement with court oversight).
112 Note that a court’s statements on the law of a different sovereign are not authoritative. For example, when a contract directs a Georgia court to apply Florida law, the
Georgia court is deprived of the opportunity to create substantive legal precedent.
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Of course, procedural flexibility by party agreement plays a
major role in civil litigation after a court and the relevant rules of
decision are set. The Federal Rules prioritize party agreement as
a means for managing litigation. Familiar examples include party
stipulations to increase the quantity, length, or form of depositions, interrogatories, or document production in discovery.113 By
agreement, parties can circumvent the automatic disclosures otherwise required by the Rule governing discovery.114 More generally, the Federal Rules delegate to the parties broad power to
modify discovery by stipulation.115 Parties can agree to try issues
not raised in the pleadings,116 and in some cases can change deadlines without leave from the court.117
5. Unilateral party control.
Then there is unilateral party control, which refers to rules
that permit a party to invoke a procedure without need for agreement from their counterparty or the court. This type of flexibility
does not fit comfortably in the core/non-core paradigm. It is not in
the core because the parties, not the judge, exercise flexibility.
But it is not flexibility exercised through party agreement, either.
Unilateral party control means that a party can change procedural defaults without agreement from anyone.
In a sense, some of the most fundamental actions in dispute
resolution are subject to unilateral party control. Filing a civil action is a unilateral action. Filing suit imposes new duties and burdens on the defendant and the court, with no need to obtain assent from any other party or the court.118 Note, though, that this
form of unilateral control is not exclusively held by would-be
plaintiffs. In some jurisdictions, would-be defendants can initiate

113 See FRCP 30(a) (depositions); FRCP 33(a) (interrogatories); FRCP 34(b) (production of documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things).
114 See FRCP 26(a).
115 FRCP 29.
116 See FRCP 15(b)(2) (allowing trial of issues not raised in pleadings if parties explicitly or implicitly consent).
117 See FRCP 15(a)(2) (deadline for amending pleadings); FRCP 26(a) (timing of automatic disclosures).
118 Defendants in turn have this unilateral power with respect to third-party defendants, so long as they implead them within fourteen days of their original answer. See
FRCP 14.
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litigation when an action is threatened, if only to dispel the uncertainty from an indefinite threat of future suit.119 And within
limits, a party is free to withdraw a filed case as well.120
Once suit is filed, procedural rules endow parties with a panoply of procedural entitlements that each party has the right to
exercise unilaterally. Such procedures include discovery requests
(depositions, interrogatories, document requests, requests to admit, and so on) up to the default limits prescribed by the Rules.121
For some forms of discovery, such as document requests, the
Rules do not prescribe default limits. 122 Discovery requests are
limited to seeking nonprivileged information relevant and “proportional to the needs of the case,”123 but the Rules leave wide latitude for a party to unilaterally define the scope of discovery,
whether directed toward parties or nonparties.124 And of course
each party has the unilateral right to demand a jury trial in cases
“at common law.”125 In short, answers to the question, “How much
procedure?” are often within the unilateral discretion of each
party.
But a party taking fewer than ten depositions is exercising
procedural flexibility only in a limited sense because it is not
changing the default limit of ten. Although relatively rare, in
other places, unilateral control over procedure allows a party to
create more procedure rather than merely elect less than the
Rules permit. For example, after a party requesting a deposition
designates a method of recording the deposition, any other party
may unilaterally designate a different, additional method.126
Importantly for our purposes, a party designating a method
for recording bears the cost of making that recording. Such a requirement—that a party pay for the process that it is triggering—
may seem intuitive or obviously correct. But for every other example above, this is not true. We consider this a puzzle. Why does it
119 See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC § 2201. See also generally Sharon Hannes
and Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Defendant Initiated Litigation, 40 Tel Aviv U L Rev 173 (2017)
(in Hebrew).
120 The Rules limit this unilateral power, however, to withdrawals before the defendant has filed an answer or motion for summary judgment. See FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
121 See, for example, FRCP 30(a)(1), 33(a)(1), and 34(a).
122 See FRCP 34.
123 FRCP 26(b)(1).
124 See FRCP 34(c) and 45 (specifying availability of discovery from nonparties).
125 See US Const Amend VII. See also FRCP 38. In such trials, each party has the
unilateral right to strike prospective jurors with peremptory challenges. See 28 USC
§ 1870 and FRCP 47(b).
126 See FRCP 30(b). Methods of recording could include video, audio, stenography, etc.
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seem natural that a party that unilaterally invokes a method of
recording a deposition should bear the cost of producing that record, when the norm in essentially every other facet of discovery is
that a party may exercise its right to request discovery while placing the cost of producing the requested answers or materials on
the other party?
The Rules may be (for the most part) silent on this, but courts
sometimes are not. Recognizing that in high-stakes litigation discovery can become very expensive, 127 meaning that parties can
use the cost of responding to discovery requests as a bludgeon,
some district court judges have exercised their authority to “specify conditions for the discovery” 128 by requiring the requesting
party to pay for some or all of the costs of complying with discovery requests.129
Still, these cases are not like the example above of a party
paying its own way for the method of recording a deposition that
it demands. Instead, the party objecting to the cost of discovery
calls upon the court to regulate. Nonetheless, we emphasize that,
even if rare in practice, one possible form of procedural flexibility
is unilateral party control over procedure, where the party exercising the unilateral control must pay for the privilege of doing so.
For reasons we elaborate below, we believe this is a potentially
important and underutilized form of procedural flexibility. 130
B. Variation in Flexibility Across Case Types and Courts
As we saw, conventional wisdom has focused on which procedures can or cannot be modified by the parties. We have refined
the discussion to recognize an entire spectrum of ways in which
procedures can be modified. Still, the approach presented above
remains categorical since it seeks to match a procedure to a form
of flexibility, but such a categorical approach is not necessary.
One could also ask whether a given procedure should have a given

127 In most cases, discovery costs are low, comprising only a small fraction of total
costs. Conversely, a small fraction of cases accounts for the majority of discovery costs in
the system as a whole. See Emery G. Lee III and Thomas E. Willging, National, CaseBased Civil Rules Survey *40 (Federal Judicial Center, Oct 2009), archived at
https://perma.cc/XN4U-KXUK; William H.J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other
Metaphors for Litigation, 64 Cath U L Rev 867, 874 (2015).
128 See FRCP 26(b)(2)(B).
129 See, for example, Boeynaems v LA Fitness International, LLC, 285 FRD 331, 341
(ED Pa 2012).
130 See Part III.A.1.
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degree of flexibility in this case. In principle, at least, a procedural
rule could be flexible in one case but not in another.
The idea that the same procedural rule (say, appealability, or
the right to jury trial, or the availability of discovery) should be
rigid in some cases but open to modification in others is unintuitive. While the merits of such heterogeneity might be debatable,
for purposes of this Article, our claim is descriptive: regardless of
whether tailoring procedural flexibility to the individual case is a
good idea or a bad idea, it is happening, and we need to recognize
and study it.
Existing analyses of procedural flexibility engage very little
with this dimension of flexibility. They are primarily normative
and abstract, asking whether a particular procedure in general
should be within the core or not. But the virtue of generality rather than tailoring of procedural flexibility to the specific case is
assumed, not proven.
In this Section, we seek, again, to shake conventional wisdom. We show that, in fact, the same procedures are rigid in some
cases and flexible in others. We present two examples. First is
heterogeneity in flexibility across court systems. A look at a
small-claims court reveals both more flexibility and a very different concept of the no-flex core of procedure than one finds in federal practice. Second is heterogeneity in flexibility among cases of
the same type before the same judge. Judges—for reasons that
have more to do with their interest in making law than tailoring
procedure to the needs of the case—will exercise their own discretionary power over procedure to expand or limit the parties’ control over procedure. Thus, as a descriptive matter, procedural
flexibility can vary case-to-case, even for the same procedural rule.
1. Small-claims versus ordinary courts.
Small-claims courts provide a low-cost and informal venue for
unrepresented claimants bringing claims for modest amounts
(usually up to $10,000). 131 They are ubiquitous in the United
States.132 Because they seek to increase access to justice for unrepresented parties, their procedures tend to be simplified and
131 See Bruce Zucker and Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 USF L Rev 315, 317 (2003) (defining small-claims courts and noting variance across states in the scope of cases within
their jurisdiction).
132 As Professors Bruce Zucker and Monica Her note, “every state in the United States
has created some form of a small claims court system.” Id.
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largely discretionary for judges. This has two consequences for
procedural flexibility in small claims settings.
First, the simplification of procedure radically shrinks the set
of no-flex procedures that are otherwise taken as inherent parts
of fair process in American courts. In a revealing study of smallclaims practice in California courts, Professors Bruce Zucker and
Monica Her note several distinctive features of small-claims
courts in California. These include that the court may “consult
witnesses informally and otherwise investigate the controversy
with or without notice to the parties,”133 and only defendants may
appeal an adverse judgment.134 This is not to criticize these procedures—a full normative accounting may deem them entirely desirable—but such rules will be shocking to readers accustomed to
what is taken for granted as “due process” in federal district court!
The minimal no-flex procedures in small-claims courts call
into question the notion that there is an irreducible core of procedure essential to fair judging. To be sure, the California rules
noted above do not allow party agreement to modify the judge’s
power to investigate ex parte or to expand the availability of appeal, but to the extent that the core exists to protect the normative legitimacy of judging,135 it seems that the procedure required
for legitimacy depends on the nature of the court. Small-claims
tribunals have a thinner set of core procedural elements.
Second, to the extent that judges and parties have discretion
and flexibility, it is greater in the small-claims-court context,
where bargains struck by the parties and/or the judge are largely
unconstrained by procedural rules or appellate review. The lack
of constraints enables parties to reach agreements that are not
possible outside the small-claims-court system. For example, the
rules allow the parties, by mutual agreement, to delegate the
court’s power to a commissioner or judge pro tempore rather than
a full-time judge.136 These temporary judges are attorneys with at
least five years of experience and who have completed training for
the role. 137 Some are paid; some are unpaid volunteers. 138 This

133
134
135
136
137
138

Cal Civ Proc Code § 116.520 (emphasis added).
See Cal Civ Proc Code § 116.710(b).
See Part IV.B.
See Cal Civ Proc Code § 116.240.
Zucker and Her, 37 USF L Rev at 330 (cited in note 131).
Id.
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dramatic expansion of who counts as a California judge is up to
the parties.139
2. Watershed cases versus routine cases.
Even when (as a formal matter) two cases are entitled to an
identical amount of flexibility, courts may (as a practical matter)
cede more flexibility to parties in routine cases but enforce considerable procedural rigidity in cases they deem important. This
reflects the fact that flexibility is conducive to resolution of a dispute, usually by settlement, and inflexibility is conducive to creating legal precedents. Settlement is attractive to judges seeking
to clear cases from their dockets—but it is less attractive to judges
who see a dispute as a vehicle for rendering opinions on novel or
contested questions of law.
Although this evidence is anecdotal and not for attribution,
we note conversations with judges who have described their own
practice as pushing parties to settle if the judge perceives the case
as routine but steering the parties away from settlement if the
judge perceives the case as legally significant, such that the judge
would see value in writing opinions in the case and ultimately
having the case reach an appellate court.
A concrete example of how this might play out in practice is
the seminal case in the field of e-discovery, Zubulake v UBS
Warburg LLC.140 In that case, a securities trader, Laura Zubulake, sued her former employer, UBS, alleging sex discrimination
and retaliation.141 Despite being “a relatively routine employment
discrimination dispute,”142 UBS’s failure to adequately respond to
discovery requests by Zubulake for emails would eventually lead
to a series of novel legal questions about discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) and the nature of legal obligations
to retain ESI in anticipation of litigation. The case would generate

139 Nor is this a minor feature of the system. It might even be essential to the system’s
continued functioning. In their study of 253 small claims cases filed in Ventura County
Superior Court, Small Claims Division, Zucker and Her found that only five of the cases
(less than 3 percent) were decided by full-time judges. Id at 336.
140 See 217 FRD 309 (SDNY 2003) (Zubulake I).
141 For details of the history of the case, see Zubulake I, 217 FRD at 311–12. Zubulake I
is an example of the rare district court case that regularly appears in casebooks.
142 Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, 229 FRD 422, 424 (SDNY 2004) (Zubulake V).
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seven published opinions143 during the three and a half years from
its filing to its post-trial settlement in the district court.144
Zubulake is an example of the rare case that begins as a “relatively routine” action but develops into a case implicating new
and important legal questions.145 A case like this, unlike a case
that begins its life as a high-profile case, would presumably be the
tougher case for courts to curb flexibility, as this would require
pulling back from the status quo of flexibility established earlier
in the case. Yet even here, we see that the court had little difficulty adapting as the nonroutine quality of the case emerged. As
the paper trail left by the court reveals, when the complexity of
the case increased, the court heightened its oversight and pushed
the parties to engage in more extensive discovery and report back
to the court. 146 Discovery—a process distinctively flexible and
party-driven under the Rules—became the subject of close oversight by the court.
Importantly, the nonroutine quality of this case and the judicial control over discovery were as much a product of the judge as
of the underlying case facts. Parties fail to produce emails all the
time in litigation. If the parties in this case had not done an adequate job of teeing up the issues for the court, Judge Shira
Scheindlin could have waited for another case that was better litigated. But Laura Zubulake was a tenacious plaintiff, and her
highly remunerated position at UBS meant she was seeking millions in damages;147 hence, her legal team had ample financial incentive to vigorously litigate discovery-related issues.

143 See generally Zubulake I, 217 FRD 309; Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, 230 FRD
290 (SDNY 2003) (Zubulake II); Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, 216 FRD 280 (SDNY
2003) (Zubulake III); Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212 (SDNY 2003)
(Zubulake IV); Zubulake V, 229 FRD 422; Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, 231 FRD 159
(SDNY 2005) (Zubulake VI); Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F Supp 2d 536 (SDNY
2005) (Zubulake VII).
144 See Docket Sheet, Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, No 1:02-cv-01243 (SDNY filed
Feb 14, 2002). Notably, although all seven opinions would be published in official West
reporters (Federal Rules Decisions and the Federal Supplement), the first two opinions
were initially passed over for publication and were not officially reported until after the
third Zubulake opinion had been released. The attentive reader would have noticed that
the Zubulake opinions, which are listed in chronological order of issuance in note 143, are
out of order in terms of reporter citations.
145 Zubulake V, 229 FRD at 424.
146 See Zubulake I, 217 FRD at 324; Zubulake IV, 220 FRD at 222.
147 See Zubulake I, 217 FRD at 311 n 9 (noting that Zubulake, by her own estimation,
could be entitled to $13,000,000 in damages).
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Nor was the stardom of this case an accident. From the very
first opinion in Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin made clear her audience was not the parties but posterity: her talent as writer was
on full display, with the key opinions opening with colorful and
slyly apropos quotations from literature.148 In short, Zubulake is
an example of how judges can adjust the amount of flexibility they
yield to the parties based on whether the judge’s goal for the case
is quick disposition or precedent setting.
III. UNRECOGNIZED DIMENSIONS
So far, we have cataloged the spectrum of procedural flexibility, noting many ways in which some combination of judge and
parties can change procedures. We have argued that the scope of
procedural flexibility not only varies across procedures but also
varies for the same procedure across courts and cases. In this
Part, we show that, despite the great breadth and variety of procedural flexibility in practice, our survey of existing statutes,
Rules, and doctrine has holes—missing forms of flexibility. Forms
of regulatory flexibility, such as user fees, tradeable credits, and
auctioning of procedural entitlements, have been successfully deployed in other domains but appear to be absent from civil procedure. Indeed, these ideas sound downright radical in the context
of civil procedure.
In this Part, we describe these other forms of flexibility, explain their benefits in other regulatory domains, and translate
those benefits to the civil procedure context. Given the plausible
benefits of new approaches to flexibility, it is natural to wonder
why we don’t already see them built into current civil procedure.
148 See, for example, Zubulake I, 217 FRD at 311 (“The world was a far different place
in 1849, when Henry David Thoreau opined (in an admittedly broader context) that ‘[t]he
process of discovery is very simple.’”); Zubulake IV, 220 FRD at 214 (“Documents create a
paper reality we call proof.”), quoting Mason Cooley, City Aphorisms, Sixth Selection
(Pascal Press 1989); Zubulake V, 229 FRD at 424 (ellipsis in original and citations omitted):

Commenting on the importance of speaking clearly and listening closely, Phillip
Roth memorably quipped, “The English language is a form of communication!
. . . Words aren’t only bombs and bullets—no, they’re little gifts, containing
meanings!” What is true in love is equally true at law: Lawyers and their clients
need to communicate clearly and effectively with one another to ensure that litigation proceeds efficiently. When communication between counsel and client
breaks down, conversation becomes “just crossfire,” and there are usually
casualties.
The key opinions in the series are Zubulake I, IV, and V. Zubulake I is the most famous,
but to the discerning student of e-discovery, just as it is with the discerning fan of Star
Wars, Episode V is the best.
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We therefore pose the question: If these forms of flexibility are
desirable, can we find examples of courts experimenting with them?
Perhaps surprisingly, courts are experimenting with these
forms of flexibility. In the last Section of this Part, we detail several under-the-radar examples of radical flexibility in current
civil litigation. Although none of these examples is expressly permitted by statute or Rule, enterprising district court judges and
lawyers have experimented with crude versions of ideas like trading procedural entitlements across cases or auctioning procedural
rights to the highest bidder.
A. Unrecognized Forms of Procedural Flexibility
1. Payments and prices.
When a plaintiff files a claim, she must pay filing fees.149 But
when a defendant files an answer, when either party files a motion or a jury demand, or when a party serves a discovery request
on the other party, there is no fee. Indeed, in our review of the
spectrum in Part II.A, we found only one example of a Rule that
required a party to pay for a procedure they chose to add.150 This
asymmetry leads us to the first gap we identify in the spectrum
of procedural flexibility: current procedural law is full of examples
of rules which enable the free exercise of flexibility by agreement
or unilateral discretion, but virtually no examples where there is
a price or fee for modifying or adding procedures.
Despite their rarity in practice, fees for flexing procedure are
an intriguing possibility as a policy matter. Consider an analogy
between (public) courts and (public) roads. Roadways are valuable public infrastructure. We build roads at public expense because we want people to drive on them. Their value comes from
being used, but each new user increases congestion, affecting
every other user. Well-calibrated tolls can maximize the aggregate benefit of a road to drivers. The challenge is to set tolls so
that when drivers make their unilateral decisions to drive, they
internalize the effect of their driving on overall road congestion.
The key idea here is that when roads have few cars on them, adding one car to the road has minimal effect on other drivers, but
adding one car to a more crowded road increases delays for everyone by slowing the overall flow of traffic. Thus, tolls for using a
149
150

See 28 USC § 1914 (setting a $350 filing fee).
See Part II.A.5; FRCP 30(b)(3).
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road should rise as the road becomes more congested. “Congestion
pricing” is the term used to describe tolls that are calibrated to
reflect the level of congestion on a given road at a given time.
Making drivers pay higher tolls when roads are congested encourages drivers with flexible schedules to save money by driving at
other times, thereby improving driving times for everyone who
must drive at peak travel times.
By ensuring that drivers internalize the effects of their driving on congestion, proper design of tolls can make all drivers better off, even after accounting for the cost of tolls to drivers. Indeed,
in some cases, the benefits of congestion pricing can be so great,
and so widely distributed, that all drivers are better off, even if
the revenue from tolls is thrown away!151 The key to this happy
result is that tolls need not be an all-or-nothing proposition—
some lanes can have tolls while other lanes do not. Those who
want a faster commute can move to a fast lane by paying more,
thereby supporting maintenance that benefits all users, and their
move reduces congestion in the free lanes as well. Thus, those who
are unwilling or unable to pay tolls nonetheless benefit from the
presence of toll lanes.152
Another way that tolls can reduce congestion is by incentivizing less wasteful use of the roads. An example of this can be
found on many turnpikes in the US, where drivers who use
prepaid electronic tolling systems (such as E-ZPass) receive a discount relative to drivers who pay cash at toll plazas.153 Toll plazas,
which slow or stop traffic, increase congestion and air pollution.154

151 Jonathan D. Hall, Pareto Improvements from Lexus Lanes: The Effects of Pricing
a Portion of the Lanes on Congested Highways, 158 J Pub Econ 113, 120 (2018).
152 Id at 120–21. The logic behind this remarkable result proceeds in two steps: First,
precisely because congestion is inefficiently high without fees, imposing (optimal) fees increases private cost to fee-payers by less than it increases social benefit to all. Because the
total cost of optimal fees is (by definition) less than the social benefit of the fees, such fees
improve allocative (Kaldor-Hicks) efficiency, even if the fees are thrown away. Second,
imposing fees on all users of a road may harm users with low ability to pay. To address
this, one can both vary fees by time of day and partition the road into toll lanes and free
lanes. Toll lanes are faster but more expensive, but Professor Jonathan Hall’s key insight
is that by regulating congestion externalities, fees increase total throughput, that is, carsper-minute, on the road. In equilibrium, some of this throughput increase accrues to free
lanes. Consequently, it is possible for fees on some lanes to be Pareto improving for all
drivers.
153 For an example of a prepaid electronic tolling system, see Illinois Tollway, About
I-Pass, archived at https://perma.cc/5UHM-EJAB.
154 Indeed, a recent study found that the introduction of E-ZPass reduced carbon monoxide levels by 40 percent in areas that no longer needed toll plazas, which in turn led to
a 10 percent reduction in low birth weight among babies born to mothers living nearby.
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Likewise, we provide courts (at public expense) because want
parties to use them—but each case on the docket increases the
congestion that all litigants experience. Court fees, like road tolls,
can help control congestion by forcing litigants to account for both
their private benefits and the public costs of using the system
more heavily. This is why when a plaintiff files a claim, it makes
sense that she must pay filing fees. Similarly, charging fees to
parties that seek to increase the use of individual procedures may
allow courts to regulate docket congestion in a more precise way—
akin to charging tolls only for certain lanes or for certain drivers
who contribute the most to traffic congestion.
FIGURE 2: A SPECTRUM OF FLEXIBILITY WITH PAYMENTS
→ Increasing Flexibility
No
Flex

Judge
Control
(+Pay)

Judge and
Party Control
(+Pay)

Mutual
Unilateral
Party Control Party Control
(+Pay)
(+Pay)

...

Despite their rarity, payments as a component of procedural
flexibility have potential merit, and in principle, courts could use
pricing and fees much more than they currently do. Thus, we add
to the spectrum of procedural flexibility the possibility of flexibility requiring a payment. Figure 2 redraws Figure 1 and adds a
payment option for each type of flexibility. By “payment,” we
mean something distinct from a payment amount that parties
might agree to as part of a mutual agreement to modify procedure. Rather, we refer to a fee or price that a party must pay in
order to invoke flexibility, even when acting unilaterally. Such
payments could go from one party to the other, in which case the
payment would serve to compensate the other party for the extra
burden the new procedures impose on it. The payments could go
from a party to the court, in which case the payment would serve
to compensate the court for the additional burdens the new procedures place on the judge or the court system more generally.
For that matter, one can also imagine a system in which a judge

Janet Currie and W. Reed Walker, Traffic Congestion and Infant Health: Evidence from
E-ZPass, 3 Am Econ J: Applied Econ 65, 84–86 (2011).
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unilaterally exercising control might have to spend court funds to
pay the parties to exercise flexibility or to forgo its exercise.
Although pricing and fees for procedure are rare in practice,
they have attracted scholarly attention. Indeed, in response to
concerns about the congestion and other externalities in litigation, some scholars have advocated taxing procedural activities or
increasing user fees in courts.155 Notably, though, most of these
proposals advocate a fee-per-case solution. Thus, this line of argument tends to take as given an all-or-nothing approach to procedural flexibility. This overly coarse approach to pricing suffers
from at least three major weaknesses. First, the fee is not proportionate to the externality; it is the use of court time and resources,
not the filing of the complaint itself, that generates most of the
congestion. Second, and relatedly, there is wide variation in the
intensity with which cases are litigated, and a one-time fee does
not even attempt to match the expected burden imposed by a specific case. Third, raising filing fees does little to address distributive equity concerns because, as a practical matter, high filing
fees may exclude many litigants and especially the poor from
court. This latter reason is, no doubt, why this proposal, so frequently made, remains a dead letter.
Our spectrum of procedural flexibility reveals another way: a
fee-per-procedure—or, more accurately—fee-per-deviation-fromdefault-procedure approach. This would better tie the externalities from procedural activities to the costs that parties are forced
to internalize. Some scholars have already taken cautious steps

155 Examples include Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform
195–210 (Harvard 1996) (discussing the overcrowding problem and suggesting a user fee
with limited exceptions); Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should
Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 Cath U L Rev 267, 272 (1985); Bruce L. Hay, Christopher
Rendall-Jackson, and David Rosenberg, Litigating BP’s Contribution Claims in Publicly
Subsidized Courts: Should Contracting Parties Pay Their Own Way?, 64 Vand L Rev 1919,
1925–26 (2011) (suggesting mandatory user fees in commercial contract disputes with limited exceptions); Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 Ind L J 1527, 1528
(2010) (suggesting a scheme whereby “each litigant would bear responsibility for one half
of court usage costs, collectible at the conclusion of the case”); Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good? “Overcrowded Courts” and the Private Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 899, 900 (2013) (suggesting “a fee high enough to reimburse the court for its costs of adjudicating [a] case . . . [such that] litigation [would] look
more like arbitration”). See generally Patrick E. Longan, The Case for Jury Fees in Federal
Civil Litigation, 74 Or L Rev 909 (1995); Shay Lavie, Quotas, 34 J L & Polit 21 (2018)
(proposing quotas on the use of legal procedures as an alternative to user fees).
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in this direction by, for example, proposing fees for the use of
juries.156
When a party decides to use a specific procedural rule, that
party imposes external costs not only on the court system through
docket congestion and judge time, but also on counterparties. In
fact, some procedural choices have little effect on the court but a
large effect on other parties. Take discovery requests, for example. So long as it is not litigated, a discovery request may have no
effect on the court’s time.157 But complying with a discovery request can be burdensome to the responding party. Thus, one can
imagine that for some procedures, the law could allow a party to
unilaterally deviate from the default only so long as it fully compensates the other party (and, if appropriate, the court) for the
burden it imposes on them.
This type of procedural flexibility takes an approach known as
“Rule 2” under Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s
framework.158 Rather than negotiating an agreement to flex procedure, a party unilaterally flexes the procedure, but pays for doing so. Thus, for example, a plaintiff may exercise his option—
technically, a “call option”—to take more depositions, provided he
pays the defendant a predetermined price and the court system a
predetermined fee. In this way, a party compensates the other
party and the court for the externalities it creates. Once we recognize that such an approach basically gives parties a call option
on a procedure (where the procedure is the underlying asset),
even more can happen. As is well-known from the literature that
conceptualizes Calabresi and Melamed’s legal rules as call options, there are other forms of options, borrowed from the finance
literature, that offer additional variations on flexibility.159 These

156 See generally Longan, 74 Or L Rev 909 (cited in note 155) (advocating payment of
jury fees).
157 Discovery requests do not even need to be filed with the court. See FRCP 5(d)(1)(A)
(stating that, absent certain circumstances, “depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents or tangible things or to permit entry onto land, and requests for admission” do not
need to be filed with the court).
158 Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1120 (cited in note 15).
159 See, for example, Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 Intl Rev L & Econ
269, 278–82 (2004); Ian Ayres and J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale L J 703, 709 (1996); James E. Krier and
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light,
70 NYU L Rev 440, 442 (1995); Ian Ayres, Monsanto Lecture, Protecting Property with
Puts, 32 Valp U L Rev 793, 801–18 (1998). See also generally Ian Ayres and Paul M.
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 Mich L
Rev 1 (2001).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140585

2020]

The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility

921

include consecutive call options, put options, and many others.160
To demonstrate how consecutive call options may work, consider
a case in which the plaintiff unilaterally decides to pay extra dollars to depose another witness, essentially exercising a call option
for another witness. Then, the defendant pays a larger amount to
block that extra witness. But why stop here? After several such
consecutive rounds the right to depose or to block the extra witness will land in the hands of the local highest valuer. Indeed,
this set of consecutive call options mimics a local auction between
the plaintiff and the defendant on the right to have extra witnesses. Of course, because it is a local auction in which no external parties participate, we do not get many of the benefits of an
external auction, such as that the right to depose an extra witness
will land in the hands of the global highest valuer.
To demonstrate how put options might work, we first recall
that a call option gives a party a unilateral right to purchase extra
procedure at a predetermined price even when the other party
objects. A put option, in contrast, gives a party a unilateral right
to sell extra procedure at a predetermined price even when the
other party objects. For example, imagine a plaintiff files a lawsuit and the defendant counters with a motion to dismiss. The
defendant might be happy with an offer from the court to withdraw his motion to dismiss in return for a more lenient standard
on a motion for a summary judgment, or even in return for cash
from the plaintiff. In this scenario, a put option would allow the
defendant to unilaterally sell his motion to dismiss to the plaintiff.161 Whether giving a party a call option to buy an entitlement
it does not have is superior to giving a party a put option to sell
an entitlement it has (or may have in the future) might depend

160 For an excellent book demonstrating how different legal rules can be conceptualized as different types of options (albeit not demonstrating it in the civil procedure context)
see generally Ian Ayres, Optional Law: The Structure of Legal Entitlements (Chicago
2005). See also Ronen Avraham and Zhiyong Liu, Private Information and the Option to
Not Sue: A Reevaluation of Contract Remedies, 28 J L Econ & Org 77, 81 (2012); Ronen
Avraham and Zhiyong Liu, Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive
Versus Optional Remedies, 8 Am L & Econ Rev 523, 526, 545–47 (2006).
161 There are several reasons why such a scheme might be desirable for the defendant.
First, the defendant might want to hedge against the risk of his motion to dismiss being
rejected, and so will be happy to give up the motion in exchange for better procedure later.
Second, the defendant might foresee similar lawsuits coming, and so would like to litigate
the case in order to possibly deter future (better prepared) parties (such as parties who
did not miss the statute of limitation deadline) from filing lawsuits.
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on whether the potential buyer or potential seller has better private information about who is the highest valuer of the
entitlement.162
As attractive as the idea of a fee-per-flex regime is, we note
the potentially insuperable epistemic burdens (and political costs)
of assigning prices to each procedural right. Expecting policymakers to be willing, let alone able, to assign exact prices to the use
of each of the many procedural rights seems to demand too much
as a practical matter. In the next Section we turn to a different
approach: what might be called “market-based flexibility.”163
2. Markets and auctions.
As with payments, markets rely on prices to improve the
allocation of resources and internalize externalities, but unlike
court-set (or legislature-set) prices, markets allow prices to
emerge out of the disaggregated activities of everyone in the market, which tends to impose smaller epistemic burdens on
policymakers.
If procedural entitlements can be bought and sold among participants in the system, and the pricing of such procedures incorporates their net social costs (or benefits), then markets can address problems, such as congestion, that existing approaches to
procedure do not. Yet markets in procedure are virtually absent
from either the scholarly debate or real-world practice. At least
sometimes, however, trading of legal entitlements is permitted at
the claim level, that is, a claimant can sell her entire claim to
someone else, who can then bring the claim.164 This alienability of
legal claims creates a form of flexibility for parties in litigation.
Nonetheless, the idea of one person selling their procedural rights
to a third party is unheard of in civil procedure.

162 See Ayres, Optional Law: The Structure of Legal Entitlements at 25 (cited in
note 160).
163 Similarly, the literature on pollution control has debated whether price control or
quotas are the better way to go. See generally Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices,
Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice, 22 Oxford Rev Econ Pol 226 (2006);
Robert N. Stavins, Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments, in
Karl-Göran Mäler and Jeffrey R. Vincent, eds, 1 Handbook of Environmental Economics
355 (Elsevier Science 2003); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am L & Econ Rev 1 (2002).
164 There is, for example, active buying and selling of creditor claims in major bankruptcy proceedings. See Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims
Trading, 4 Brooklyn J Corp Fin & Comm L 67, 72–76 (2009).
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We seek to make market-based approaches part of the conversation on procedural design. Figure 3 redraws Figure 2 above
and adds “markets” to the right end of the flexibility spectrum.
Market-based approaches represent maximum possible procedural flexibility, inasmuch as they allow buying, selling, and trading of procedural entitlements between parties to a case or even
between parties in different cases.
FIGURE 3: THE COMPLETE SPECTRUM OF FLEXIBILITY
→ Increasing Flexibility
No
Flex

Judge
Control
(+Pay)

Judge and
Party Control
(+Pay)

Mutual
Unilateral Markets
Party Control Party Control
(+Pay)
(+Pay)

There are two primary approaches to allocating the initial set
of entitlements in a market-based system where entitlements can
be traded: a cap-and-trade system and an auction system. In both
systems, the courts would first set aggregate, system-wide limits
on total procedural activity. These aggregate limits would reflect
a collective judgment about how much congestion and cost is optimal (or at least acceptable) for the system as a whole. These aggregate limits would then be converted into procedural “credits”—
virtual tickets that parties could redeem in order to utilize a procedure. Parties would be free to buy and sell credits—buying credits for procedures they plan to use more of and selling credits for
unneeded procedures to raise money.
For example, let’s say that there are 15,000 motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed in the federal courts each
year. (There are about 250,000 civil actions filed in federal court
each year, and motions to dismiss are filed in about 6 percent of
them. 165 ) Let’s assume for sake of argument that policymakers
think that number is about right. Then, in a market-based approach, the courts would set an aggregate limit of 15,000 motions
to dismiss per year. Based on this limit, the courts would create
15,000 credits for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
In order to file such a motion, a party would need to redeem one
165 Joe S. Cecil, et al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal *8
(Federal Judicial Center, Mar 2011), archived at archived at https://perma.cc/2MAA
-R4RU. See also Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, archived at https://perma.cc/L7YU-7CAA.
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of these credits. If a defendant doesn’t have a credit for a motion
to dismiss, then it must buy one or it can’t move to dismiss.
The key distinction between the cap-and-trade and auction
methods is the step between setting the aggregate cap and allowing parties to trade. Before trade can occur, the court system must
first allocate the total credits to parties in some way. The difference between the cap-and-trade method and auction method is
how the credits are initially allocated among parties. In a capand-trade system, the courts simply divvy up the total among
litigants in equal shares, and then allow them to trade these
endowments of procedures freely in open markets.166 In an auction system, the same aggregate, system-wide limits on total procedural activity would not be handed out but instead auctioned
off to whomever wishes to bid for them, and then the procedures
would be freely tradeable thereafter.
In both cap-and-trade and auction systems, though, the basic
idea is to set the aggregate amount of a given procedure (depositions, motions, hearings, etc.) at an acceptable level, and then let
parties freely allocate the total among cases through secondary
markets. Because the total number of credits is fixed, the courts
can control the total amount of court congestion and procedural
activity. But because credits are freely tradeable, litigants retain
the ability to exercise procedural flexibility to customize their own
cases to their needs and budgets. Parties who want more procedure can buy it from parties who are willing to litigate with less.
Markets in procedure harness the power of supply and demand to give litigants incentives to litigate in a way that considers their effect on the system as a whole. Parties whose reduced
activity eases the burdens on the system are rewarded, because
they can generate income by selling their credits. Parties who
place greater burdens on the system in terms of congestion and
cost have to pay for credits in order to have that privilege. This
gives parties a disincentive to over-litigate, regardless of whether
they are doing so because they fail to consider their effect on overall congestion, or because they are trying to impose burdens on

166 The idea of allocating caps among parties (whether equal shares or not) is related
to the idea of setting quotas on procedure. Professor Shay Lavie has recently analyzed the
idea of a system of “quotas” given to parties. See Lavie, 34 J L & Polit at 33–40 (cited in
note 155).
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their opponents. Parties will think twice before filing another motion or issuing another discovery request if they can profit from
selling that entitlement to someone else instead.167
Markets in procedure not only allocate procedure across cases
more efficiently but also increase court efficiency by reducing
waste from court time spent on requests to modify procedural defaults. In a market-based system, parties don’t file motions requesting additional pages or depositions or hearing time—they go
out and get what they need on the market. Fewer motions for
leave to take additional discovery or file longer briefs means less
congestion for everyone and more judicial attention devoted to the
substance of parties’ claims.
In these ways, market-based approaches would reduce court
congestion and more broadly improve allocative efficiency by ensuring that procedures are being used by (and only by) those who
value them most highly. Nonetheless, there remains the important fact that allocative efficiency is limited by ability to pay.
The highest-value users, from society’s point of view, may not
have the resources or access to credit to pay for some procedural
entitlements. This is a concern for any market-based system, and
the markets in procedure that we imagine are no exception. But
it is crucial to recognize that the relevant comparator for a market
in procedure is not a utopia where no litigant has a disadvantage,
but the real-world status quo, which is marked by severe disparities in litigant resources. The relevant question from the standpoint of allocative efficiency and distributive equity is whether
markets would be better than their alternatives, and in particular
the status quo. As we will explain further in Part IV, marketbased approaches for allocating procedure may on balance
ameliorate current disparities in the ability to utilize procedural
entitlements. Thus, we believe these approaches at least merit
consideration when they can be implemented to improve distributive equity among litigants.
In the remainder of this Section, we provide additional discussion of the cap-and-trade and auction approaches, noting some

167 In Israel, courts achieve something similar to this with respect to motion practice.
Under new rules that took effect in 2019, a party who files a motion but then loses the
motion may have to pay the costs of the party who defended the motion. See Israel Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 53 (2018) (effective date Sept 5, 2020) (in Hebrew) (“At the end of
the hearing on each motion, the Court shall determine the expenses of the motion and the
parties to whom they apply, irrespective of the results of the main proceeding, unless it
finds that there are special reasons not to charge such expenses.”) (translation by author).
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of their potential features and bugs and giving concrete examples
of how these ideas could be applied to specific procedures.
Cap and trade. Examples of allocating procedural entitlements via a cap-and-trade system include the following:


Depositions under Rule 30. There are about 250,000 civil
cases per year in the federal courts, and most do not require the default maximum of ten depositions by each
side.168 Let’s say for the sake of argument that there is an
average of four depositions per case (two for each side),
and let’s assume that our goal is not to restrict discovery
but solely to improve the allocation of depositions across
cases. A cap-and-trade system would set the new default
to two depositions per side in each case but allow parties
who will not use all their depositions to sell their allocation to other parties (either their opponents, co-plaintiffs,
or parties in other cases).



Page limits for briefs and time limits for hearings. Currently, when parties want to prepare a brief that exceeds
the default length limits set by their court, or they want
to have hearing time in excess of the time chosen by the
court, they file a motion for more pages or more minutes.
The irony of this is that these limits are supposed to save
the time and attention of the judge, but because the limits
are only defaults, judges have to devote time and attention to the motions to change the limits. Even if a judge
denies a motion for more pages or more minutes, that motion itself has wasted the judge’s time! Rather than allow
motions of this sort, a cap-and-trade system requires parties who want to exceed their default number of pages or
minutes to buy credits for those excess amounts from
other parties (in the same case or in other cases) who will
use less than the default amount. Such a change will doubly improve the use of courts’ time hearing motions and
reading briefs: First, parties will be more likely to forgo
borderline arguments since they now need to pay for the
time and space to make them. Second, courts won’t have
to spend their time hearing and deciding motions for extensions of page limits or additional hearing dates. That

168

Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018 (cited in note 165); FRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(1).
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time and space will be allocated through supply and demand rather than judicial deliberation.


Juror time. Jury trials are expensive and time consuming
for parties, courts, and the jurors themselves, but they are
also a treasured institution of the American civil justice
system. One way to sustain the use of juries while regulating their overall cost would be through cap-and-trade.
For example, every case that reaches the trial stage could
be allocated a total of twelve days of juror time—enough
for a one-day trial with a jury of twelve, or a two-day trial
with a six-person jury. Parties that wish to save money
could opt for a bench trial and sell their allotment to parties in another case who wish to have a longer trial or a
larger jury.169

Note that the cap-and-trade approach involves assigning procedural entitlements in equal shares to each litigant. In this respect (only), cap-and-trade is no different from the status quo,
where one’s status as a litigant entitles one to a fixed and equal
bundle of procedures. What makes cap-and-trade novel is a litigant’s ability to buy, sell, or trade her procedural entitlements
with any other litigant, not merely her counterparty in the
same case.
The cap-and-trade approach has a simple and intuitive
method for initial allocation of credits. It retains the feature of the
current system that each litigant, once a case is filed, receives the
same default set of entitlements. This central feature of the capand-trade approach, however, leads to a potential bug. What if
someone files a lawsuit with no intention of pursuing a claim, but
merely to sell off the default bundle of procedural credits he receives when he files the suit? This possibility is something that
any cap-and-trade system would need to foreclose.
We note two potential responses to this concern about filing
suit just to sell procedures. First, it may be that this possibility

169 In theory, one could construct an auction-based alternative to this cap-and-trade
scenario. However, because an auction system would likely involve parties bidding for the
right to have a jury trial (rather than receiving an entitlement that they can trade away),
this system would run afoul of the constitutional right to trial by jury in cases at common
law. See US Const Amend VII.
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will not materialize. Filing suit is itself costly.170 It exposes the
filing party and lawyers to sanctions for groundless claims. 171
Selling off all the procedures in a case—a dead giveaway for a
sham suit—may not generate enough income to compensate the
filing parties and their lawyers for the costs of filing plus the expected cost of sanctions. (And, if we are wrong about this, then in
a cap-and-trade system there is an argument for increasing both
filing fees and the sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuits.)
Second, initial allocations of procedural rights need not be
tied to the filing of a lawsuit. Instead, entitlements could exist
entirely independent of a filed suit. Each natural person in the
United States, for example, could receive their per capita share of
procedure each year and sell it if they want to. This way, there is
no incentive to file suit to gain entitlements.
As an alternative to the cap-and-trade system, we next consider the auction system, which retains the benefits of tradable
procedure but avoids complications associated with how to allocate initial entitlements.
Auction. The auction approach is in some respects an even
more radical alternative to the status quo. This approach shares
features of the cap-and-trade approach, and we will argue it
avoids some of the bugs, such as parties filing cases merely to sell
the procedures. In an auction system, rather than simply allocating the total amount of procedure among all litigants, procedural
entitlements are auctioned off to the highest bidder, and the revenues can be used to subsidize low-income litigants or supplement the court system’s budget. Any procedures that are
auctioned would be freely tradable, no different from under the
cap-and-trade approach.
Thus, the auction approach involves a radical rethinking of
two aspects of procedural flexibility: First, unlike cap-and-trade,
it revolutionizes how procedures are initially assigned to cases
and litigants. Second, like cap-and-trade, it opens up procedural
flexibility to include trades with parties in different cases. The
auction approach treats the capped amount of procedure like the
broadband spectrum—a public resource to be auctioned off. The
auction process, plus a freely trading secondary market, would
170 Filing a civil action in federal court costs $400 in fees. See 28 USC § 1914 (setting
a $350 filing fee); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Aug 20, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/KR5B-WSK2 (setting
a $50 administrative fee for initiating a civil action).
171 See FRCP 11.
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ensure that procedures would be available to all litigants, but at
prices that would force them to account for their impact on the
system as a whole and purchase credits only if, after factoring in
external effects, the procedure is still worth it to them.
To again offer concrete examples, we revisit the procedural
examples from cap-and-trade and describe how an auction system
might address them:


Depositions under Rule 30. To continue the example
above, there are about 250,000 cases per year,172 and we
have assumed an average of four depositions per case.
This means there are a total of 1,000,000 depositions per
year. An auction system could allocate one deposition to
each side and auction off credits for the rest (that is, the
remaining 500,000). Revenue from the auction could be
used to fund legal aid for indigent litigants (including subsidies for additional depositions!).



Page limits for briefs and time limits for hearings. In an
auction setting, credits for pages and minutes could be
purchased at auction or in a secondary market from parties who no longer need their pages or minutes. Indeed, in
an auction setting, motions themselves could be allocated
by markets. A total cap on the number of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions for summary
judgment, motions for reconsideration, etc., could be set
based on the aggregate numbers filed in recent years, or,
if as a normative matter we concluded that parties were
wasting court time with too many motions to dismiss, the
courts could set a lower aggregate maximum number of
motions to dismiss per year. Then, at regular intervals
(for example, every month) the courts would auction off
credits (for example, one-twelfth of the annual cap), and
parties that want to file a motion to dismiss could purchase credits at the going price. There would be a secondary market where parties could resell their credits, and
anyone who missed an auction could buy credits on the
open market.



Appeals. As discussed earlier, under the final judgment
rule, a party has a right to a single appeal after final judgment in the district court level. Beyond this, opportunities

172

Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018 (cited in note 165).
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for appeal are few, although parties may request additional opportunities for interlocutory appeal subject to the
discretion of the district court and the appellate court.173
A major justification for the final judgment rule is to reduce congestion and delay in the courts; a major justification for the exceptions is to allow interlocutory appeals
when the value of immediate appeal is unusually high.
But by requiring both the district court and the appellate
court to hear and decide petitions for discretionary interlocutory appeal adds additional motion practice and judicial involvement that exacerbates the problem of expense
and delay that justifies limits on appeals in the first place.
One alternative could be to set a total number of interlocutory appeals that each circuit court will hear, and then
auction off the appeals. (In this example, each party
would remain entitled to one appeal after final judgment.)
This shifts the burden of sifting urgent interlocutory appeals from appeals that can wait from judges to the parties themselves, who know better whether an appeal really is necessary to their case. Parties also (by paying for
the appeal) internalize the costs of increased congestion
in the appellate court that their appeals impose.174
We emphasize here that non-market- and market-based approaches are not mutually exclusive. Hybrid approaches to procedural flexibility are possible and could potentially capture the relative strengths of each. For example, one could combine a
baseline amount of procedure that cannot be traded or sold with
auctions for any procedures above that baseline amount. This hybrid approach would ensure that all litigants have access to a
baseline set of procedures without the need to avail themselves of
a market. It would also spare judges the need to hear motions
seeking leave for additional procedure and keep the aggregate
quantities of procedures within optimal ranges. Plus, the auction
portion could raise money to support the court system or subsidize
in forma pauperis litigants.

173

There is also the collateral order doctrine. See Parts II.A.1 and II.A.3.
In principle, interlocutory appeals could alternatively be handled through capand-trade, although since most cases are never appealed, a cap-and-trade system that apportioned appeals evenly across cases would involve each case receiving only a fraction of
a single interlocutory appeal. Thus, an auction might be a simpler mechanism.
174
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Further, we reiterate what we have emphasized above: our
goal in this Article is fundamentally descriptive. Recognizing possibilities like cap-and-trade or auctions for allocating procedures
opens up new possibilities for the design of civil justice systems,
but these possibilities may or may not be desirable. As the experience of regulatory efforts in other domains teaches, marketbased regulation can alleviate many of the shortcomings of
command-and-control, but they are not panaceas. For example,
trading credits for emissions of pollutants may give rise to “hot
spots”—dangerous concentrations of pollution in a single area,
when diffusion of lower levels of pollution over a wider area would
be safer.175 While we leave for future work the ultimate balance of
pros and cons for any form of procedural flexibility, we emphasize
here the importance of recognizing potential innovations such as
market-based solutions. Seeing the full spectrum of flexibility
opens up new avenues for reform, and as we will now explain,
helps identify nascent forms of these innovations in current
practice.
B. Are Market-Based Solutions Missing—or Hidden?
The use of tools like congestion pricing or cap-and-trade in
civil litigation sounds radical. It is. So perhaps it is no surprise
that many readers might assume that these approaches to
flexibility are unprecedented. Certainly, most lawyers and academics have not considered them before. But are they truly
unprecedented?
This question is not merely a matter of academic curiosity.
One might worry that since we have not seen such innovations
emerge in practice, either the problems they address are not significant problems or the solutions they offer do not work. In short,
if these approaches to procedural flexibility are good ideas, why
haven’t they appeared already—at least somewhere and to some
extent?
In Part II, we documented many different types of procedural
flexibility. Now that we have identified new forms of flexibility,
we can return to our task of charting existing practice. It is possible that radical forms of flexibility, like trading procedures between different cases, are not unprecedented; instead, the precedents have remained undetected. As we show below, once we
175 See Stavins, Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments at
420 (cited in note 163).
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understand what to look for, we do in fact find early signs of markets, congestion pricing, and auctions in current practice. While
we are unaware of explicit or well-developed markets or auctions
in procedure, we argue that some features of contemporary litigation are manifestations of exactly the novel procedural categories
we describe. Due to their ad hoc origins and lack of grounding in
express rules, however, these procedural innovations are underdeveloped and undertheorized as forms of procedural flexibility.
Below, we describe two contexts in which the problems that
have motivated the use of pricing, markets, and auctions in other
contexts have led courts and lawyers to apply procedural flexibly
in ways that mimic—sometimes explicitly, but more often subtly—innovations like congestion pricing, cap-and-trade, and auctions. These are class actions and multidistrict litigations
(MDLs).
Notably, both contexts involve the aggregation of large numbers of similar claims, and this commonality is no coincidence.
Current practice limits procedural flexibility to adjustments and
trades within a given case, while the innovations we consider allow flexibility across cases. Class actions and MDLs involve a
middle ground where many claims coexist in the same case (class
actions) or in a set of nominally separate cases coordinated before
a single judge (MDLs). Within the context of class actions and
MDLs, a judge can maintain the norm of cabining procedural flexibility within a single proceeding, 176 while also permitting the
judge or the lawyers to make procedural trade-offs across cases in
ways akin to what our market-based approaches envision.
We begin with class actions. There are two forms of procedural flexibility in class actions that are nowhere formally recognized by statute or Rule but occur in practice and serve as precedent for the market-based innovations we envision. These are
auctions for class counsel (an explicit invocation of the auction
concept) and reallocation of rights and compensation across class
members (a non-market-based practice analogous to a cap-andtrade allocation across class members).

176 We are fudging a bit here, but this is because the judges are fudging, too. We say
“proceeding” rather than “case” because individual cases consolidated in an MDL remain
distinct civil actions. So, when courts in MDLs engage in the cross-claim procedural flexibility we describe below, they are actually much closer to markets and congestion pricing
than first appears.
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We then turn to MDLs to describe three forms of de facto marketbased procedural flexibility. These are Plaintiffs’ Steering Committees and bellwether trials (both non-market-based practices akin
to a cap-and-trade allocation of procedural rights across plaintiffs), and Lone Pine orders (a crude form of congestion pricing).
1. Class actions.
Aggregating individual cases is a way to reap efficiencies of
scale in litigation. Unlike joinder, in which each party retains
their own counsel, class action litigation places the claims of an
entire class (almost always plaintiffs) in the hands of a single
class counsel. Class actions generate widely recognized benefits
for the civil justice system. They generate economies of scale by
conducting once what would otherwise be duplicative litigation on
issues common to the claims of each class member. And these
economies of scale, in turn, make it worthwhile for plaintiff’s lawyers to bring claims that would not be cost-effective to bring on
an individual basis.
a) Auctions for class counsel. Part of a court’s duty in certifying a class action is selecting class counsel.177 In selecting class
counsel, the court must select counsel who will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,”178 and one component
of this is ensuring that attorney fees for class counsel are charged
at a competitive rate, so as to maximize the share of any payout
that will go to the class. Yet the judge is not in a good position to
set fees or to review attorney fees in a proposed class settlement.
Some class actions are risky and expensive for class counsel, so
high fees are not necessarily unreasonable.
Rather than having a judge unilaterally choose class counsel
and evaluate attorney fees, a market-based approach would invite competition among law firms. One possible method, which
some district courts have employed, is for the court to auction off
the right to represent the class (and therefore to collect fees).179
The basic idea is that firms bid by offering the amount of fees they
would charge, and the lowest bidder wins.

177

FRCP 23(c)(1)(B).
FRCP 23(g)(4).
179 See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 FRD 71, 78–82 (SDNY 2000)
(discussing prior cases employing auctions, and ordering an auction in the case before the
court). The first case to order an auction was In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 136 FRD
639, 641 n 4 (ND Cal 1991) (acknowledging the “relative novelty” of competitive selection
of class counsel).
178
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The use of this form of market-based allocation of class counsel has been controversial, however. As a theoretical matter, if
counsel quality cannot be observed by the court, then there is a
danger of a “race to the bottom” where low-quality counsel underbid counsel who would demand more in fees but earn more for the
class. 180 Indeed, the potential merits of auctioning the right to
class counsel (or even auctioning the underlying claims) has been
the subject of a vigorous academic debate for more than twenty
years.181 In practice, the use of auctions in class actions has dried
up after coming under criticism for its questionable legality and
practicality.182 But whether wise or unwise to do so, courts have
put the right to represent a class on the auction block. Procedural
auctions are not a mere theoretical possibility.
b) Reallocation of rights and compensation across class
members. The fact that class actions combine otherwise-distinct
claims into a single civil action and consolidate control over those
claims in the hands of a single class counsel and presiding judge
has major implications for how the judge and parties exercise procedural flexibility. As noted above, current law specifies no way
for parties to trade procedures across cases. If a plaintiff wants
more depositions or more hearing time, for example, she must either work it out with the defendant or file a motion with the judge.
By collecting a large group of distinct claims in a single action and
giving a single team of lawyers control over them, the class device
converts what would be untradeable procedural entitlements into
a pool of de facto tradeable procedural rights.
Class counsel seek relief on behalf of the class, but the class
device gives some class members more procedure than others.
Representative plaintiffs get more procedure (both the benefits,
such as their “day in court,” and the costs, such as responding to
potentially intrusive discovery requests). Absent class members
get less procedure (usually no more than notice and opportunity
to opt out and, in the event of settlement, opportunity to object).
Importantly, when we say representative plaintiffs in a class
action get more procedure, we mean not just more procedure than
absent class members get. As a practical matter, they get more

180 See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum L Rev 650, 658 n 195 (2002).
181 For a recent contribution and a review of the literature, see Alon Klement and
Moran Ofir, Auctioning Class Action Representation (working paper 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/PE4K-PKLK.
182 See id at 10–11.
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procedure than they would get were they to bring identical claims
on an individual basis. With the benefit of a class standing behind
them, class plaintiffs usually obtain vastly more motion practice
and discovery than they would in individual litigation. Of course,
no procedural entitlements are formally changing hands. But as
a practical matter, when a class action is certified, a large group
of would-be litigants surrender the procedural entitlements they
would have if they litigated separately, while a small number of
representative plaintiffs gain an expanded arsenal of procedures
to deploy. This can be seen as a crude (and involuntary!) approximation of cap-and-trade: if each plaintiff litigated separately,
they would each have their individual procedural entitlements to
employ, but the class device in effect trades all of these procedural
entitlements from absent class members to the class representatives, who litigate far more heavily than any individual plaintiff
would. In effect, class members exchange their procedural entitlements for the ability to free ride on the efforts of class representatives and class counsel.
In this way, the class device serves as a workaround to the
general inability of plaintiffs who lack the means or motivation to
use the full set of available procedures to trade them away to
other plaintiffs in separate (albeit similar) cases. The allocation
of attention and procedural rigor among class members involves
flexing across parties and nonparties, something otherwise alien
to current practice and procedure.183
Still, this de facto reallocation of procedure across plaintiffs
is a far cry from trading or selling of those entitlements. No one
consults (or even notifies, generally) absent class members before
filing a lawsuit that seeks class action status. It is only after the
court certifies the class action that absent class members receive
notice, and only then do they have a choice to stay in or opt out of
the class action. (And for some types of class action, there is not
even an opportunity to opt out.184) There is certainly no open market where some persons can sell unwanted procedures or purchase additional procedures.

183 Recall that absent class members, although bound by the judgment in the class
action, are not parties to the suit. See FRCP 23.
184 See FRCP 23(b)(1)–(2).
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The rules governing class actions instead rely on rules that
hybridize market approaches and command-and-control approaches. We can see this through the lens of exit and voice.185 In
a setting of freedom to contract, parties could negotiate for the
procedures they want (voice), and if the deal is unsatisfactory,
they could walk away (exit). In a proceeding to certify a class action, the absent class members (who may not even be aware that
a suit has been filed) have no voice, so the Rules place a duty upon
the court to, in some sense, “speak” for the class in judging the
fairness and adequacy of the representation they would receive.186
But (at least in most cases) class members do have the opportunity to exit, in that once the deal is struck and the terms of a
certified class are fixed, each individual member of the nowcertified class receives notice and the right to opt out.187
Of course, sometimes command-and-control, or a mixture of
command-and-control and markets, is better than markets alone.
The transaction costs associated with individualized bargaining
or decision-making by each class member prior to class certification may make class member “voice” impractical in most class actions. Our purpose here is not to judge the wisdom of class action
rules.188 For now, we highlight that class actions reallocate procedure among claimants to show that forms of flexibility already
exist that go beyond flexibility involving discretion of the judge
and/or the parties to a given case. Although only implicitly, the
law already recognizes the value of procedural trades between
parties and nonparties.
2. Multidistrict litigation.
Multidistrict litigation is a statutorily authorized process
through which related cases in the federal system, regardless of
where they are filed and whether they are individual cases or
class actions, are transferred for coordinated pretrial litigation
before a single district court judge.189 Multidistrict litigation is arguably the single defining feature of contemporary civil practice,

185 See generally Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline
in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard 1970).
186 See FRCP 23(a), (g).
187 See FRCP 23(c)(2)(B).
188 In a companion paper, we explore this question and the broader question of when
market-based forms of flexibility are wise or unwise in greater depth. See generally
Avraham and Hubbard, Civil Procedure as the Regulation of Externalities (cited in note 19).
189 See 28 USC § 1407.
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with over 40 percent of all civil case filings in federal court ending
up in MDLs.190 Several distinctive practices in MDLs increase the
efficiency of litigation and reduce court congestion, including
(1) selection of a Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee to oversee the resolution of common questions across cases, (2) bellwether trials,
where the judge selects a sampling of cases for full-blown trials to
inform settlement decisions in other cases or aid the creation of
rubrics for standardized compensation for groups of similar
claims, and (3) special procedures such as Lone Pine orders for
screening out cases at the pleading stage.
None of these devices for managing MDLs is regulated (or
even explicitly authorized) by statute or Rule, and their use in
MDLs is ad hoc, entirely within the discretion of the judge. Indeed, MDL judges have aggressively exercised judicial discretion
to flex procedures, leading one pair of commentators to describe
MDLs as “something of a cross between the Wild West, twentiethcentury political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies.”191 Many MDL judges themselves say that “the very hallmark
of the MDL is the ability to deviate from traditional procedures.”192 Thus, the unique procedures of MDLs embody no deliberate federal policy to expand procedural flexibility beyond its traditional bounds. Yet that is exactly what MDLs are doing. As we
show below, the innovations we observe in MDLs parallel the
kinds of flexibility we have described in this Article, even if they
are not currently understood as doing so.
a) Plaintiffs’ Steering Committees. An MDL coordinates
litigation among dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of separately filed cases, each with their own plaintiffs and attorneys. As
a practical matter, it would be exceedingly difficult for a district
judge to coordinate proceedings directly with all of the dozens or
hundreds of different lawyers and law firms. Thus, for the sake of
efficiency, the MDL judge typically appoints a group of attorneys—the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (PSC)—to serve as the
leadership group responsible for coordinating litigation on behalf
of all the plaintiffs. As one scholar has noted, notwithstanding the
norm that an individual plaintiff can retain a lawyer of her own
190 Elizabeth J. Cabraser and Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92
NYU L Rev 846, 850 (2017).
191 Martin H. Redish and Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 BU L Rev 109,
111 (2015).
192 Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U Pa L Rev 1669, 1689 (2017).
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choosing to handle her case, “[t]he individually retained attorney
has no power to appoint or discharge the leaders who assume control of her clients’ cases.”193
In any given MDL, the PSC undertakes to coordinate litigation in a way that serves the interests of all the plaintiffs, al
though of course conflicts of interest among individual plaintiffs
or between the PSC and lawyers representing individual plaintiffs are inevitable. One respect in which the interests of the PSC
and the rest of the lawyers and parties in the MDL are always
aligned, however, is in efficient management of the MDL—
gaining economies of scale from coordinated proceedings. To do
this, the PSC works with the judge and defense counsel to handle
the litigation of common issues in a consolidated (and therefore
lower-cost) way. Methods include filing a “master complaint,” filing a single set of discovery requests, allowing discovery only from
subsets or samples of the plaintiffs, and, as discussed in more detail below, fully litigating or trying a limited number of cases in
order to facilitate settlements for the remainder.
When a common issue is litigated in an MDL, it receives more
extensive briefing and argument than it would in any one individual case litigated separately. The PSC has more resources and
the stakes are higher. In this way, all plaintiffs benefit from the
more thorough litigation and the spreading of costs across cases
within the MDL.194
But in another sense, cases or plaintiffs selected for greater
discovery or extra attention from the PSC get more procedure,
while the rest get less. In this way, the MDL device reallocates
procedure across plaintiffs and across cases. Like with the class
action device, this is a crude approximation of cap-and-trade,
where a given aggregate quantity of procedure available to individual plaintiffs is reallocated across plaintiffs in the consolidated
proceeding.195 This degree of flexibility is usually ignored in the
literature on procedural flexibility but is akin to the unrestrained
trading across cases of procedure that we imagine. We note that
193

Burch, 90 NYU L Rev at 88 (cited in note 99).
The effects for the defendant are more ambiguous. The more extensive procedure
is costlier to the defendant, but the spreading of costs across cases in the MDL is a benefit.
And to the extent that the MDL facilitates the filing of cases that otherwise would never
have been filed individually (including meritorious ones), this increases a defendant’s expected liability and costs.
195 Note that this trading and reallocation across (rather than within) cases is not
only de facto, as in class actions, but de jure, given that MDL cases remain distinct civil
actions throughout the process.
194
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the “trading” here is implicit and (unlike in a market-based solution) not mutually agreed upon. The court selects attorneys for
inclusion and exclusion from the PSC, and thereafter the allocation of procedure is a mixture of negotiated deals with lawyers in
individual cases and PSC fiat. Thus, it has elements of the open
trading across cases that we envision, but it does not fully realize
that vision. Given the inevitable divergence between the interests
of the PSC and the interests of the individual plaintiffs unrepresented on the PSC, we are open to the argument that a purer market for procedure might better empower individual plaintiffs in
situations such as these, where (whether explicitly acknowledged
or not) procedural rights are already being traded across cases.
b) Bellwether trials. One of the key questions that PSCs,
judges, and defense attorneys must address in MDLs that reach
an advanced stage is the possibility of trial in the MDL rather
than remand of the cases back to their home districts for trial.196
Given that mass settlement is almost always the endgame in
MDLs, both plaintiffs and defendants have an interest in doing
trials in the MDL if such trials will facilitate settlement. To facilitate settlement, parties will often designate a small sample of
cases for trials, called “bellwether trials,” to inform the parties of
how their evidence and arguments will likely fare before juries.
For parties who are close to settlement but disagreeing on the
terms, seeing the outcomes of trials in several representative
cases can close the gap and precipitate settlement.197
Different judges and different lawyers favor different methods for selecting cases for bellwether trials.198 Most of the time,
judges delegate the selection to the parties, sometimes allowing
each side to identify half of the total number. Harder to implement and less common is random sampling among cases for bellwether treatment. This is, in principle, more likely to yield a sample representative of the whole than plaintiffs and defendants
each cherry-picking the most favorable cases for their side.

196 By statute, MDL courts can handle only pretrial proceedings, 28 USC § 1407, but
parties can consent to trial in the MDL court. See FRCP 77(b).
197 For an overview of MDLs and the bellwether trial process, see Eldon E. Fallon,
Jeremy T. Grabill, and Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation,
82 Tulane L Rev 2323, 2326–42 (2008).
198 For discussion, see Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 Geo Wash L Rev
576, 635–36 (2008).
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Regardless of the method of selection, however, because the
parties to a bellwether trial must all consent to the trial,199 the
selection of bellwether trials inevitably involves negotiation
among the judge, PSC, and defense attorneys, and between the
PSC and the lawyers representing the individual plaintiffs whose
cases would be tried. Crucially for our purposes, this process of
negotiation among the attorneys and parties in separate cases
yields a result whereby a few plaintiffs in a few cases get lots of
procedure—full-blown trials litigated to the hilt with the fate (in
settlement) of many other cases hanging in the balance—while
the rest go dormant.200 In other words, the practice of selecting
cases for bellwether trials quite explicitly involves parties in separate cases making deals to give more procedure to some cases
than others. It is not quite a cap-and-trade market, but it is a
crude approximation.
This crude trading of more procedure in some cases for
streamlined settlement in other cases facilitates the creation of
an MDL-specific public good: information about likely trial outcomes. Each case that goes to trial creates a benefit for all the
other cases—parties now have a better sense of what to expect,
which means settlement is easier. In the absence of coordinated
proceedings, this positive externality might be underprovided, because of the free-rider problem—everyone would want someone
else to be the guinea pig who goes to trial! In a world of fluid markets, one can imagine the free-rider problem being solved by
crowdfunded trials, where everyone would chip in to cover the
cost of trying a few cases. The MDL process approximates this
solution.
c) Lone Pine Orders. In Lone Pine orders,201 MDL judges
require plaintiffs to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of
injury and exposure to the defendant’s products or other alleged

199 Recall that without consent of all parties to that case, trial can only occur after
remand to the district in which it was originally filed. See note 196.
200 Several commentators have noted that bellwether trials are far more expensive
than trials in normal litigation, as attorneys “pull out all the stops” given the high stakes
of the bellwethers for the MDL as a whole. Fallon, Grabill, and Wynne, 82 Tulane L Rev
at 2366 (cited in note 197). See also J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev 1137, 1214 (2012); Redish
and Karaba, 95 BU L Rev at 128 (cited in note 191).
201 For a comprehensive discussion, see generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 Yale L J 2 (2019). See also id at 13 (describing how “Lone Pine
orders originated and draw their name from an unpublished order . . . in an otherwise
obscure 1985 New Jersey state case, Lore v. Lone Pine Corp”).
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tortious conduct, and sometimes even specific causation.202 Lone
Pine orders are obviously controversial. In no other context in federal practice are plaintiffs required to attach such evidence to
their complaint, nor must they supplement their allegations with
evidence in order to survive a motion to dismiss and proceed to
discovery. MDL courts have explicitly noted that “no federal rule
or statute requires, or even explicitly authorizes, the entry of Lone
Pine orders.”203
Yet defenders of the practice explain that it is a practical necessity that responds to so-called tag-along cases—cases filed after the creation of an MDL, often with threadbare or boilerplate
pleadings, by plaintiffs and counsel who are inactive in the litigation. The concern with such cases is that, given the low cost of
filing a baseless tag-along complaint and the high likelihood of an
MDL-wide mass settlement, the tag-along plaintiff and her attorney will be able to collect a pro-rata share of any settlement despite expending virtually zero effort to establish that her claim
has any merit.204 Lone Pine orders address this concern by forcing
plaintiffs and their attorneys to provide a minimal showing of
colorable merit.205
Here we see forms of procedural flexibility that would likely
be considered shocking, even unlawful, in other contexts. In every
way but the strictest possible sense, a district court unilaterally
changes the standard for surviving a motion to dismiss, and only
for a particular set of cases on its docket. Yet Lone Pine orders
play a role akin to congestion pricing in urban planning. As the
saying goes, “Build a superhighway, create a traffic jam.” A highway designed to conveniently bring commuters into a city becomes a victim of its own attractiveness when drivers eager to use

202 More precisely, one might distinguish a Lone Pine order, which requires a prima
facie showing of all of these, including specific causation, with an order requiring a plaintiff fact sheet that provides evidence of only the plaintiff’s injury and exposure to the defendant’s product. Id. For simplicity, we lump plaintiff fact sheets into the general category of filings required by Lone Pine orders.
203 In re Digitek Product Liability Litigation, 264 FRD 249, 256 (SD W Va 2010).
204 For an example of an opinion expressing exasperation at this practice in one
judge’s MDL, see In re Mentor Corp Obtape Transobturator Sling Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 4705827, *1 (MD Ga).
205 What makes this controversial is that, depending on the content of a given Lone
Pine order, the plaintiff may be required, at the outset of a case, to submit evidence beyond
what one would expect to be in the possession of the plaintiff prior to discovery. See
Engstrom, 129 Yale L J at 20–22 (cited in note 201). Orders limited to the submission of a
fact sheet with information on injury and exposure are less controversial, as evidence of
these facts is more likely in the possession of the plaintiff at the outset of the case. Id.
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it clog it up. MDLs are the superhighways of the federal courts.
By making litigation cheap, fast, and remunerative for participating litigants and lawyers, a pathway designed to whisk meritorious claims to their destination may become congested with tagalong cases. By implementing higher tolls during rush hour,
urban planners limit use of the highway to those who really need
to drive at that time. By putting the onus of an initial showing of
proof on plaintiffs, MDL judges limit the benefits of the MDL to
those who really belong in the eventual settlement.
Importantly, this form of procedural flexibility offers to tagalong cases an implicit bargain: lower-cost procedure in exchange
for a higher pleading standard. Thus, both parties gain something
from the exchange. But note that it is not a freely bargained exchange. Lone Pine orders are a radical form of procedural flexibility, but they are not market based. An open question that remains, therefore, is whether explicit pricing or trading of the right
to punch a ticket to an MDL could offer a better way to reduce
congestion and screen out tag-along claims while also reducing
burdens on claimants with plausible claims.
***
In sum, our spectrum of procedural flexibility rationalizes (in
the descriptive sense) practices that otherwise seem like peculiarities of MDL and class actions practices. Our framework not
only envisions new forms of procedure, but it makes existing,
poorly understood processes more explicit and comprehensible.
IV. TOWARD THE NORMATIVE
While an assessment of how to optimize procedure must
await a full treatment, we argue here that familiar normative
considerations cannot rule out the new forms of procedural flexibility that we have identified above. In fact, many of these normative considerations cut in surprising directions, sometimes favoring market-based approaches over the status quo. While we do
not provide a normative justification for any specific proposal for
procedural flexibility in this Article, we respond to potential normative critiques of market-based approaches to procedural
flexibility.
As noted above in Part I, the extant literature suggests two
broad normative objectives of civil procedure: dispute resolution
(facilitating the timely, low-cost, and accurate resolution of disputes) and norm creation (facilitating the creation of law by
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courts). Below, we show that even the most exotic forms of procedural flexibility—things like auctions or markets in procedure—
are at least defensible (and arguably might be superior to existing
forms) when measured against these criteria.
We then add three additional normative considerations to the
mix: democratic participation in the legal system, commodification, and distributive justice. If concerns about democratic participation in the court system are paramount, we argue that better
tailoring will increase, not decrease, parties’ participation and
might well counter the drift away from courts to alternative dispute resolution systems. If concerns about commodification of
procedure are paramount, then things like auctions and markets
look dubious (although we argue that even this conclusion is not
so simple). If concerns about distributive equity among parties in
the civil justice system are paramount, we argue that (counterintuitively) approaches such as tradeable credits for procedural
rights will reduce inequalities of resources and bargaining power
between parties.
To be clear, we do not claim here that any particular point on
the spectrum of procedural flexibility is optimal for any type of
procedure. Rather, our point in this Part is to show that familiar
normative criteria are not sufficient in themselves to select
among this wide spectrum of options. This indeterminacy is exactly why a broader, more ambitious normative framework is necessary. To construct a prescriptive agenda for procedural design
requires knowing which innovations are “better.” In subsequent
work, we undertake this task.206 For now, we simply aim to show
that our new descriptive framework poses an important and new
set of normative questions: Which procedures and what type of
flexibility are best for a given court?
A. Goal: Dispute Resolution
Civil procedure is (if nothing else) a system of rules of the
game created to help parties resolve their dispute efficiently and
fairly. Market-based allocation schemes are designed with allocative efficiency in mind. When parties have to pay for the procedures they use, this will, on the margin, discourage litigation that
is not well tailored to the legitimate needs of a case. This serves
the goal of efficient dispute resolution.
206 See generally Avraham and Hubbard, Civil Procedure as the Regulation of Externalities (cited in note 19).
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What about accurate decision-making, which also serves the
broader goal of dispute resolution but may be at odds with lower
cost? This is an open question. Deviation from procedural defaults
today requires either party agreement or judicial approval (or
sometimes both). In a market-based system, party willingness to
pay replaces judicial fiat. This presents a trade-off. On the one
hand, if judges value accuracy more than parties (perhaps because judges believe that greater accuracy improves the legitimacy or deterrent value of judgments), then a shift away from
judicial fiat may reduce accuracy. On the other hand, the court is
(almost by definition) the least informed player in the dispute and
thus the least likely to have a clear sense of the benefit, in terms
of accuracy, of additional procedure.207 Market-based approaches
place greater power and responsibility in the hands of the betterinformed players—the litigants themselves.
In short, market-based approaches to procedural flexibility
would improve allocative efficiency of procedure and may even
improve the accuracy of dispute resolution.
B. Goal: Norm Creation and Legitimacy
With respect to the norm-creation goal, we begin by observing
that most cases simply do not generate important precedents,
clarify ambiguous parts of the law, or otherwise have any chance
of impacting future parties’ behavior. Most cases settle, and even
those that do not rarely involve a precedent-setting appellate
opinion. Therefore, choices about procedural flexibility are orthogonal to the goal of norm creation in most cases. In the few
cases that are important to the objective of norm creation, we
have described above how a court may ensure that party control
over procedure does not interfere with this objective. 208 Simply
put, if courts’ wishes can trump the parties’ wishes when norm

207 Judge Frank Easterbrook has written (with characteristic flourish) about this
problem in the context of discovery. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 BU L
Rev 635, 638–39 (1989) (emphasis in original):

Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the legal
claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves. The timing is all
wrong . . . . A judicial officer does not know the details of the case the parties will
present and in theory cannot know the details. Discovery is used to find the details. The judicial officer always knows less than the parties . . . . How can a
judge distinguish a dry hole (common in litigation as well as in the oil business)
from a request that was not justified at the time?
208

See Part II.B.
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creation is on the line, then the use of any form of procedural flexibility in other cases will not impact the goal of norm creation.
There is also the potential concern that greater procedural
flexibility will undermine the perceived legitimacy of the civil litigation process. Ultimately, perceived legitimacy is an empirical
question, and perceptions of illegitimacy may depend on the specific type of procedural flexibility in question. Thus, we cannot
dismiss wholesale this concern. By the same token, it may not be
the case that perceived legitimacy is threatened by even the most
radical forms of procedural flexibility.
Consider markets in tradeable credits for procedure. This
would be a radical change from the status quo, surely, but would
it undermine the perceived legitimacy of the courts? Reformers in
the United States undertook bold reimaginings of procedure in
the past, such as abandoning writs for simplified pleading in the
nineteenth century, abandoning law and equity for the unified
civil action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
and inventing the modern class action in 1966. Each wave of reform was intensely controversial but over time came to be second
nature for lawyers.209
This is so despite there being nothing inevitable about these
reforms. Many aspects of these reforms, such as liberal pleading,
party-driven discovery, and opt-out class actions, are examples of
American exceptionalism in procedure. Their absence is as much
second nature to lawyers outside the US as their presence is
taken for granted among lawyers inside the US. All this is to say
that the perceived legitimacy of the system may depend much less
on maintaining the procedural status quo than one might assume.
Further, the perceived legitimacy of procedural design depends on its suitability to the social and technological context in
209 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of
the Class Action, 77 Colum L Rev 866, 866 (1977) (noting controversy over the promulgation of the new Rule 23 in 1966); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U Pa L Rev 909, 922
(1987) (describing how the adoption of the Rules in 1938 brought about “an enormous
change”). See also Charles E. Clark and James W.M. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. The Background, 44 Yale L J 387, 390 (1935):

Experience teaches us, that while individual members of the bar are enlightened
agents of reform, the general professional reaction is, quite naturally, against
change . . . . It is only human for a successful practitioner to conclude that the
practice of which he has made himself master is a desirable one to follow.
See also Henry H. Fowler, A Psychological Approach to Procedural Reform, 43 Yale L J
1254, 1265 (1934) (noting the almost inevitable conservatism in the approach toward
procedure).
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which courts operate. This is most colorfully illustrated by Professor Peter Leeson, who shows how archaic procedural devices
such as trial by battle and trial by ordeal can be understood as
well suited to the limits of courts’ dispute resolution technology
(for example, poor records of land title and few resources for fact
investigation) and shared cultural understandings of the time (for
example, a belief that divine favor would protect the innocent). 210
The change from 1938 to today may not be as stark as
England’s emergence from the Dark Ages, but it is fair to say that
the technology by which products and services can be allocated
and the social understanding of how individuals consume has radically changed over the past eight decades. Vast computing power
and internet connectivity means that a degree of product disaggregation and unbundling is possible today that would have
been prohibitively expensive in the past. As a consequence, individuals have become much more used to the idea of buying only
as much as you need.
For example, rather than buying a car, someone who doesn’t
need to drive as often can join a car-sharing program such as
Zipcar. Such programs save money for light users of cars who
would otherwise have to buy cars, and they increase access to
driving for people who cannot afford a car.211 Importantly, such
programs yield societal benefits by increasing the number of
users per car, thereby reducing land required for parking spaces
and lots.
Similarly, the idea of paying a stranger for a ride in their personal car or paying a stranger to sleep for one night in their apartment was almost unthinkable for most people a decade ago,212 but

210 See Peter T. Leeson, Trial by Battle, 3 J Legal Analysis 341, 348–51 (2011); Peter
T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J L & Econ 691, 705–08 (2012).
211 Similarly, someone who likes only a few songs from a music album can purchase
individual songs online rather than the entire album in physical form. This saves money
for those who would otherwise have to buy the entire album and increases the ability to
consume music for those unable or unwilling to pay for the full album. And with streaming
music services, one need not even buy a song for perpetuity, but instead may listen to as
much or as little of that song as one likes. For a discussion of how technological change
has allowed consumer to purchase “slices” of what used to be “lumpy” goods, see Lee Anne
Fennell, Slices and Lumps: Division and Aggregation in Law and Life 124–26
(Chicago 2019).
212 Uber Technologies, Inc. was founded in 2009; Airbnb, Inc. was founded in 2008.
See Uber Newsroom, The History of Uber (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/E45X
-EMYR; Airbnb Newsroom, The Airbnb Story (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/T3WR
-GC95.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140585

2020]

The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility

947

this is second nature to millions of Americans now. Thus, redefining procedure not as a fixed bundle of procedural entitlements but
as a disaggregated menu from which litigants can select the most
valuable components à la carte should seem much less radical today than even in the recent past.
C. Goal: Democratic Participation
With respect to the “democratic participation” value of civil
procedure, we doubt that new forms of flexibility, such as markets, would have a negative effect. In fact, they may have positive
effects. To the extent that this goal implicates access to courts and
a preference for dispute resolution in court rather than through
settlements, market-based flexibility should be attractive. Because markets in procedure would allow parties to tailor procedure to their interests, victims of wrongdoing would be more willing to litigate their claims rather than settle, arbitrate, or drop
them. Further, given that litigants on the margin of suing in court
versus dropping their claims are likely to be the same litigants
who cannot afford to use all the procedures they are formally entitled to under the status quo, tradable credits in procedure would
make court more attractive because unused procedure would be
monetizable.213
D. Goal: Distributive Equity
Should we worry that new forms of procedural flexibility,
such as tradeable credits for procedures, will disproportionately
benefit the rich? The rich could purchase more pages of briefing,
more depositions, more document discovery, longer appeals, and
who knows what else, couldn’t they? Our response is: Yes, they
can, and they will. But the truth is that the rich already have a
huge advantage in our legal system. They can get more lawyers,
more experts, more forum choice, more everything. 214 The question is not whether the rich have an advantage—that is virtually
inevitable—but whether the design of the procedural system ignores this advantage or accounts for it and even counteracts it.

213 Or, if procedures are auctioned rather than allocated to litigants, litigation would
cost less for these litigants relative to everyone else.
214 See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DePaul L Rev 649, 656
(2010) (presenting empirical evidence that the more financial resources that are available
to a party in litigation, the greater its chances, all else being equal, of a favorable legal
outcome).
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Any analysis of the impact of procedure on poor or otherwise
disadvantaged litigants must assess the realities of litigation
from the perspective of those parties. 215 Currently, the rich already buy longer briefs, more discovery, and more court time, but
they do not have to pay the courts or their adversaries for this
privilege.216 To the contrary, courts’ decision-making burdens are
increased by the aggressive motion practice of heavily lawyered
parties, and counterparties must pay more to keep up with them.
The poor are currently subsidizing the rich. In contrast, with congestion pricing or markets, parties who place greater burdens on
courts and their adversaries would have to pay for that privilege.
The rich would subsidize the poor.
In an auction system, the revenue from the sale of procedural
entitlements could be used to increase court resources, reduce
court fees, or subsidize needy litigants. In a cap-and-trade system, the poor could directly profit by selling procedural entitlements they cannot use. And because there would be a market for
procedure across cases, a poor party would not be limited to bargaining (perhaps on unfavorable terms) with a well-heeled adversary, but would be able to tap into a larger, more liquid market.
Other market makers, such as third-party litigation funders,
could help poor parties buy more procedural rights in return for a
stake in the lawsuit.
The fact that any litigant is free to negotiate with anyone, not
just their opponent, equalizes bargaining power. Under the status
quo, in David-and-Goliath cases, the weak party has no choice but
to bargain for procedures with a monopolistic opponent who holds
greater bargaining power. But in a free-market-based system, a
party facing a powerful or stubborn opponent could walk away
from a bad offer. In a market setting, there is a “going rate” for
each procedure. The powerful litigant and the weak litigant pay
exactly the same going rate for a deposition or a motion to
dismiss.
The existence of predictable market rates for different quantities of procedure may also foster the expansion of legal insurance, prepaid legal, and third-party litigation finance markets.
Financial intermediaries would be able to more accurately price
products that, in the event of litigation, guarantee coverage for a
215 For an extended development of this idea, see generally Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 Yale L J 1478 (2019).
216 They must pay their own lawyers, of course, but this cost does not capture the
externalities they impose.
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certain level of procedural intensity. These products would benefit the rich and poor alike, but in our estimation, the poor will
benefit more. This is because wealthy individuals and businesses
already have sophisticated forecasts for litigation costs and the
ability to self-insure against the costs of litigation. Less wealthy
individuals and organizations, however, stand to benefit from insurance against litigation cost risk that offers lower premiums
and well-tailored coverage.
Moreover, the nature of the rights being traded can be defined in ways designed to improve distributional consequences.217
For example, one can require at least some of the procedural adjustments to be symmetric across the parties in an individual
case—that is, a plaintiff could buy additional briefing space from
a third party, but the plaintiff would have to share the additional
briefing space purchased equally with the defendant. This would
help ensure that parties invested in more extensive procedure because the scope of the case required it, not because they merely
wanted to steamroll an opponent with their disproportionate investment in argument and evidence.
As a second example, an auction method could be paired with
a version of the status quo that maintains a minimum amount of
procedure as an untradeable default entitlement in every case.
This arrangement would address the concern that some litigants
will be so constrained that they will not be able to afford even a
minimum of procedure on the market. Everything above this floor
would be tradeable on the procedure market. This minimum
amount could be set to correspond to the amount of procedure that
a litigant who could not afford to purchase procedure would nonetheless be able to utilize. Unlike under the status quo, the auction
would raise revenue, and the proceeds from auctioning procedures above this floor could be redistributed. Thus, the leastresourced parties would be no worse off than under the present
rules—and possibly much better off, especially if revenue from
the sale of procedural entitlements is redistributed.
In short, contrary to what initial intuitions suggest, marketbased approaches to procedural flexibility do not necessarily raise
concerns about distributive equity. To the contrary, if designed
217 On the idea that distribution is not always most efficiently done through the tax
and transfer system, see Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of
Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 Tax L Rev 157, 207–08 (2003); Ronen Avraham,
David Fortus, and Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income
Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 Iowa L Rev 1125, 1149 (2004).
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properly, they may do far better than the status quo in this
respect.
E. Goal: Avoiding Commodification
Finally, an instinctive objection to prices, trading, or markets
in procedure is that these things reduce procedural rights to commodities. To the extent that commodification in this sense is a bad
thing, we must simply concede the point.
But what is the force of this objection, really? Parties settle
their claims all the time; indeed, settlement is the norm and trial
is the exception in American civil litigation. 218 Settlement involves the parties giving up whatever remaining procedural
rights they have in exchange for an end to litigation and (for the
plaintiff) money. Such exchanges of procedural rights for cash
sometimes occur in piecemeal ways, too. One example is a highlow settlement agreement, which limits the range of potential
outcomes of a trial to a range of liability amounts. This has the
effect of limiting parties’ freedom to pursue certain arguments at
trial, present certain evidence, or file certain objections or posttrial motions.219
Further, as we showed above, parties trade away procedural
rights on an à la carte basis every day.220 Agreements to limit depositions, stipulate to the authenticity of an exhibit, or not to object
to a motion are routine affairs. And although such trades are usually in kind rather than for cash, there are some agreements that
exchange procedural entitlements for cash. Cost-sharing or costshifting agreements for the costs of discovery of ESI are increasingly prevalent, and they explicitly involve money changing
hands in exchange for a party forfeiting objections to discovery.
Most obviously, the right to pursue justice in court comes with an
explicit price tag. In federal court, this price tag is $400, the sum
of the filing fees for initiating a lawsuit in US district court. 221

218 See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 NYU L Rev 1713,
1743 (2012).
219 J.J. Prescott and Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement,
91 NYU L Rev 59, 88–89, 115 (2016).
220 See text accompanying notes 23–34.
221 See 28 USC § 1914 (setting a $350 filing fee for a civil action in US district courts);
District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (cited in note 170) (noting that the “[a]dministrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court” is $50).
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Thus, we don’t see our proposal as inviting any concern about
commodification that does not already apply to virtually any aspect of the current system. The only thing our proposal does is
force us to admit that commodification already (and inevitably)
exists. Commodification presents a question not of whether,
but how.
All that remains, then, is the argument that even if commodification is already the reality, markets in procedure would make
this fact more transparent. The argument would be that the system benefits from obscurity, not transparency, on this score. This
may be true, but we are reluctant to accept this conclusion uncritically. This conclusion depends on two premises: First, that the
legitimacy of the system would suffer from greater transparency,
and second, that benefits from allocative efficiency and distributive justice are less worthy goals than maintaining perceived legitimacy through nontransparency. Neither premise appears to
be obviously true. As for the first premise, the power of wealth
under the status quo is obvious, so there is not much of a secret
to maintain. As for the second premise, if new approaches to procedure improve the efficiency and equity of the system, it is hard
to see how the net effect would be a loss of confidence in the
system.
CONCLUSION
The rise of party control over civil procedure is one of the defining characteristics of modern litigation. This phenomenon has
attracted the attention of an active literature that has developed
important insights into the “core” elements of procedure and the
crucial role that legitimacy plays in predicting the limits of party
control over procedure. It has detailed the rich interplay between
the centrality of judicial discretion and the rise of managerial
judging, on the one hand, and the centrality of party-driven procedure, on the other hand. Yet as we show in this Article, the
breadth and depth of these insights occupies only a subset of a
much larger conceptual space in which procedural flexibility can
and does occur.
In this Article we provided a descriptive framework for understanding procedural flexibility. Our framework not only explains familiar practices, but also points toward bold new approaches to procedural flexibility, such as congestion pricing,
auctions, and markets for civil procedure.
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We also showed that such radical steps are not purely theoretical. Less explicit, but equally radical, forms of procedural flexibility already exist in certain types of litigation. A close examination of procedures in class actions and MDLs reveals exotic and
ad hoc exercises in extreme procedural flexibility (such as class
counsel auctions, bellwether trials, and Lone Pine orders) that
serve as rough examples of a much larger set of pricing-based or
market-based approaches to procedure that we imagine. And
given that MDLs now comprise more than a third of all civil cases
in federal court, radical procedural flexibility is not a fringe phenomenon. The spectrum of procedural flexibility that we have described enables us to predict and then identify these important
innovations in procedure for what they are—the first, tentative
steps toward procedural flexibility through prices and markets.
This in turn calls for a new normative framework which will
enable judges, lawyers, and policy makers to evaluate procedural
flexibility. When is cap-and-trade desirable? When (if ever)
should the government auction procedural entitlements? When
are fees for deviating from procedural defaults desirable? When
is “no-flex” the right approach? Answering these and many other
similar questions requires traversing new normative terrain. We
take up these questions in our companion work.222

222 See generally Avraham and Hubbard, Civil Procedure as the Regulation of Externalities (cited in note 19).
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